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Tutkimuksen tarkoitus
Empiirisesti yritykset, jotka ovat korkeasti bruttokannattavia, ovat tuottaneet osakemarkkinoilla
suurempia tuottoja kuin alhaisemman bruttokannattavuuden omaavat yritykset, mikä viittaa brut-
tokannattavuuspreemion olemassaoloon. Syy kyseisen preemion olemassaoloon on kuitenkin tois-
taiseksi tuntematon. Operatiivista vipua on kuitenkin ehdotettu preemion aiheuttajaksi. Tosin
aiempi kirjallisuus on perinteisesti liittänyt operatiivisen vivun arvopreemioon, jonka on toisaalta
näytetty olevan negatiivisessa yhteydessä kannattavuuspreemioon. Kirjallisuus ei ole toistaiseksi
onnistunut selittämään kyseistä epäjohdonmukaista kolmisuhdetta, minkä vuoksi käsitys siitä ai-
heuttaako operatiivinen vipu bruttokannattavuuspreemion vai ei, ja mikä on operatiivisen vivun
suhde arvopreemioon, on puutteellinen. Siispä tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on sekä teoreetti-
sesti että kokeellisesti selittää kuinka operatiivinen vipu suhteutuu edellä mainittuihin preemioihin.
Lähdeaineisto ja tutkimusmenetelmä
Tutkimuksen lähdeaineisto on ajalta 1962–2014 ja koostuu yrityksistä, jotka ovat listattuina NYSE-,
NASDAQ- ja AMEX-pörsseissä. Kuukausittainen markkinainformaatio on kerätty Center of Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP) -tietojärjestelmästä ja vuosittainen tilinpäätösinformaatio on ke-
rätty Compustat-tietojärjestelmästä. Useita piste- sekä joustavuuspohjaisia mittausmenetelmiä
operatiivisen vivun suuruuden arvioimiseksi on hyödynnetty, sillä operatiivinen vipu ei ole suoraan
havaittavissa. Hypoteesien testaamiseksi ovat sekä osakeportfoliot rakennettu että yksi- ja moni-
muuttujaregressiot ajettu käyttäen bruttokannattavuutta sekä eri operatiivisen vivun mittausmene-
telmiä.
Tulokset
Yritykset, joilla on korkea bruttokannattavuus omaavat selkeästi korkeammat operatiiviset vivut
kuin heidän heikommin kannattavat kilpailijansa, kun operatiivista vipua mitataan pistepohjaisella
mittausmenetelmällä, joka arvioi suoraan kiinteiden kustannusten suhteellisen suuruuden. Jousta-
vuusmittarit sen sijaan korreloivat negatiivisesti bruttokannattavuuden kanssa, sillä ne ovat ennem-
minkin yhteydessä alhaisiin voittomarginaaleihin samoin kuin arvopreemio. Täten joustavuusmit-
tareita, jotka arvioivat operatiivisen vivun suureksi yrityksille, jotka toimivat lähellä kriittistä pistet-
tään, voidaan pitää harhaisina. Sen sijaan suorempi pistepohjainen operatiivisen vivun mittausme-
netelmä kuvaa paremmin korkeista kiinteistä kustannuksista aiheutuvaa riskiä.
Käyttämällä pistepohjaista arviointimenetelmää kokeelliset tulokset osoittavat, että suhde opera-
tiivisen vivun ja arvopreemion välillä tulisi olla negatiivinen. Lisäksi bruttokannattavuuspreemion
havaitaan olevan voimakas toimialoittain, mutta heikko yli toimialojen.
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1. Introduction 
Novy-Marx (2013) finds that profitable firms measured by gross profitability (sales minus cost 
of goods sold and scaled by total book assets) have historically generated significantly higher 
returns than firms having low profitability, even though they have higher valuation ratios. This 
spread in returns between profitable and unprofitable firms is called the gross profitability 
premium. Fama and French (2015) even added the profitability effect as a new factor to their 
latest asset pricing model, the five-factor model, to capture the excess returns emanating from 
profitability not captured by the original three-factor model. (See e.g., the evidence from Novy-
Marx, 2013.) 
 
The interrelation between risk and return is probably the most prominent corner stone of the 
financial theory, and at the same time is undoubtedly among the topics most researched by 
academics. The theory suggests that securities (e.g., stocks) with higher risk should be priced 
lower than similar securities carrying less risk, and thus have higher returns to compensate 
investors for holding those risky securities in their portfolios. According to the neo-classical 
financial theory based on the efficient market hypothesis, any additional factor (e.g., 
profitability in Fama-French five-factor model) explaining excess returns should characterize 
risk factors that investors require higher returns for.  
 
However, profitability as a risk factor seems counterintuitive as profitable firms should in 
general be better positioned to cope with negative market shocks than firms operating with 
lower margins. For example, if an industry faces a shock that reduces the prices of goods by 1 
percent the effect on a firm operating with a 10 percent margin is significantly different to the 
effect on a firm operating with a 2 percent margin. In the first case the margin decreases by 10 
percent and in the second by 50 percent. The intuition here suggests that investors should 
require higher returns for holding firms with low levels of profitability. Although, the empirical 
findings suggest the opposite, there exists a profitability premium, i.e., profitable firms have 
higher average returns than unprofitable firms.  
 
The profitability premium is relatively uncovered topic in the financial literature, thus lacking 
of a solid theoretical framework and well-tested empirical results, therefore the determinants 
of the profitability premium are not well understood. Furthermore, it seems difficult to 
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reconcile the profitability premium with traditional risk-based explanations (Novy-Marx, 
2013). The most recent contribution in order to explain why the profitability premium exists 
comes from Kisser (2014), who suggests that operating leverage (OL), which Lev (1974) 
defines as the proportional share of fixed operating costs relative to variable operating costs, 
as a risk factor, causes the profitability premium. Degree of operating leverage (DOL) 
describes the magnitude of this relationship between the fixed and variable costs.  
 
Kisser (2014) uses sales, general, and administrative (SGA) expenses as a proxy for the actual 
fixed costs (SGA expenses are generally for the most part fixed, at least in a short-term). Using 
fixed costs as a proxy for the operating leverage is consistent with the previous literature (see 
e.g., Carlson et al., 2004; Zhang, 2005). Kisser (2014) finds a positive relationship between 
DOL and the gross profitability premium, but a negative relationship between DOL and the 
value premium – an anomaly, in which high book-to-market equity firms generate excess 
returns compared to low book-to-market equity firms (see e.g., Stattman, 1980, Rosenberg, 
1985). Notably, this latter result contradicts with the majority of prior research, which reports 
theoretically and empirically the association between operating leverage and the value 
premium to be positive (see e.g., Mandelker and Rhee, 1984; Carlson et al., (2004); García-
Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010; Novy-Marx, 2011). Furthermore, Novy-Marx (2013) finds an 
inverse association between gross profitability and value. In other words, there is evidence that 
gross profitability is positively associated with both gross profitability and value, whereas those 
latter two should be inversely related to each other. Kisser (2014), nonetheless, cannot explain 
why his results are contradictory to the preceding literature, which means that in the light of 
the prior literature’s evidence, one cannot conclude whether operating leverage truly causes 
the gross profitability premium.  
 
However, intuitively DOL enables a high profitability, but simultaneously is a risk factor. A 
high DOL firm has high portion of its costs as fixed, meaning that they do not adjust effectively 
downwards when a negative market shock arises. High DOL may be due to either cost trade-
off from variable operating costs to fixed operating costs (e.g., increasing the level of 
automation in production to build up scale and decrease the unit variable cost) or a plain 
increase in fixed costs not affecting the unit variable cost (e.g., increasing the sales personnel 
to boost sales). Higher DOL may also increase the break-even point (the level of sales, in which 
both the variable and fixed costs are fully covered), hence increasing the risk of not being able 
to cover the total amount of costs. Moreover, higher cost trade-off levers earnings relative to 
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sales, causing the earnings to become more sensitive to changes in sales, which obviously is a 
risk factor as the losses accumulate quicker when sales go down. Note that increasing the break-
even point causes the earnings to become more sensitive in relative terms due to the higher 
reference point (i.e., the break-even point). And, as DOL increases the risk of a firm, investors 
should require higher returns for holding such a firm in their portfolios. Furthermore, one can 
easily see that cost trade-off from variable costs to fixed costs increases gross profitability as 
well, but just increasing the amount of fixed costs without affecting the unit variable cost does 
not have an impact on gross profitability. Hence it seems that gross profitability is especially 
linked to operating leverage’s cost trade-off channel of risk. The prediction of DOL enabling 
high gross profitability contradicts with the current perception of the gross profitability 
premium, which only says that gross profitable firms should have above average returns, 
whereas the operating leverage hypothesis says that firms with high DOL should have above 
average returns regardless of their profitability as DOL is assumed to be the real risk factor, 
not the profitability itself. 
 
What makes it difficult to test any prediction regarding the degree of operating leverage is that 
operating leverage cannot be observed directly, since the true fixed costs of firms are not 
directly detectable as firms are generally not required to disclose the amount of fixed costs. 
Therefore, a method to approximate the fixed costs is required. Currently, there are two main 
approaches in the prior literature to determine the level of operating leverage: A point-to-point 
measure approach (e.g., Kisser, 2014), in which certain balance sheet or income statement 
items are directly deployed, for example, by dividing the amount of fixed assets by total assets 
to approximate DOL. Another approach, an elasticity measure based on time-series regression 
(e.g., García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010), examines how sensitive earnings are to changes in 
sales. Both approaches are used in the literature, however, without conclusion which is the 
preferred choice to approximate DOL. 
 
The situation of different methods to approximate DOL generating the opposite results is 
definitely puzzling. At first glance it makes sense that operating leverage determines the value 
premium as the majority of the prior literature suggests (see e.g., Mandelker and Rhee, 1984; 
Carlson et al., (2004); García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010; Novy-Marx, 2011). High operating 
leverage indeed can cause high B/M as the higher risk required by investors decreases the 
market value of equity, hence increasing B/M. However, Novy-Marx (2013) points out that 
gross profitable firms have higher returns even though they have higher market valuations, i.e., 
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he reports a negative relation between profitability and B/M ratios. And, as the value factor 
(the factor to capture the risk emanating from high B/M ratio – see Fama and French, 1993) 
captures the excess returns of high B/M firms, it is likely that the returns of profitable firms 
with high operating leverage are not captured by the B/M, as they should have higher valuations 
and lower B/M ratios than their less profitable peers. For those reasons, it would make sense 
that the value premium would not exclusively price the risk emanating from operating leverage.  
 
As Kisser’s (2014) proxy mimics the actual fixed costs, his results about inverse relationship 
between DOL and B/M are highly interesting, as logically higher risk caused by higher DOL 
should be reflected in a lower market value, and thus in a higher B/M ratio, which is also the 
view of the previous literature. I find Kisser’s (2014) result possible if operating leverage 
enables high profitability (e.g., via high scale of production to drive the unit total cost down or 
boosting sales by employing additional sales staff), and as the higher profitability drives equity 
values up, investors are willing to pay premium for the additional cushion against negative 
market shocks, consequently decreasing B/M ratios, causing a negative relationship between 
operating leverage and the value premium. This prediction, if assumed that DOL causes the 
profitability premium, would be in line with Novy-Marx (2013), who reports that profitable 
firms has higher market valuations, and hence lower B/M ratios.  
 
The real question is which affects the equity values more – the increased profitability pushing 
the equity values up or the increased risk pushing the equity values down? Logically, it would 
make sense that the gross profitability premium accrues to firms that are operationally levered, 
but at the same time are profitable enough to result in such high valuations that the risk 
emanating from DOL would not be captured by B/M, and hence that risk would not be priced 
by the value premium. This is possible as gross profitability measured by sales minus cost of 
goods sold divided by total book assets (Novy-Marx, 2013) enables the firms with the highest 
values of gross profitability to have very large profits relative to their size measured by book 
assets, which indicates these firms to be highly profitable also after the fixed costs, hence 
driving the equity values of these firms up. But as the previous literature suggests the positive 
association between DOL and the value premium, it seems obvious that the value premium 
prices the risk arising from high DOL for those firms, which have low margins, and thus low 
market valuations and high B/M ratios. Effectively, DOL could contribute as a risk factor to 
both the gross profitability premium and the value premium, but the value premium not being 
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able to price the risk from high DOL carried by highly profitable firms, thus giving arise for 
the gross profitability premium.  
 
It appears that the value premium, the gross profitability premium, and the operating leverage 
are all linked together, although the prior literature lacks of comprehending those relationships 
properly. If assumed that DOL causes the gross profitability premium, and by following Novy-
Marx (2013) and assuming the negative relationship between the value premium and the gross 
profitability premium, then a negative association between DOL and the value premium should 
exist, meaning that high profitability increases the equity values more than increased risk 
pushes them down – otherwise either the hypothesis of DOL causing the gross profitability 
premium or the empirical results regarding the relationship between the gross profitability 
premium and the value premium would be flawed.  
 
1.1. Research problem and purpose 
Novy-Marx (2013) reports that highly gross profitable firms tend to earn significantly higher 
returns than their less profitable peers, which should either mean that there is some additional 
risk carried by those profitable firms or those excess returns are caused by market irrationality. 
Ball et al. (2015), however, argues that as the profitability premium has persisted that long it 
is unlikely that the market irrationality would be the key determinant behind the profitability 
premium. Thus, the solution should lie among risk-based explanations. 
 
Kisser (2014) proposes that the degree of operating leverage (DOL) might cause the gross 
profitability premium. The prior research has indeed been able to show that DOL is associated 
with the systematic risk, and hence with returns (see e.g., Carlson et al., 2004; Zhang, 2005; 
Novy-Marx, 2011; García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010). Nonetheless, the preceding literature 
(e.g., Carlson et al., 2004; Novy-Marx, 2011; García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010) relates DOL 
to the value premium, which on the other hand, according to Novy-Marx (2013) is negatively 
related to the gross profitability premium. Thus, there seems to be an inconsistent triangle of 
relationships between these three; DOL, the value premium, and the gross profitability 
premium. Hence, this inconsistency suggests that something is missing in the theoretical 
framework, which is also stated by Novy-Marx (2013) who stresses that current theoretical 
frameworks are incapable of explaining the gross profitability from a risk-based view.  
Moreover, Kisser (2014) cannot explain why his results regarding DOL (based on SGA) 
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contradict with the prior literature. Hence, in the light the of the evidence of the preceding 
literature, it is not possible to conclude from Kisser’s results that operating leverage truly is the 
risk factor behind the gross profitability premium. 
 
DOL is dependent on fixed costs, which cannot be observed directly, but indirectly by using 
different approximation approaches. And, currently there are no preferred way to approximate 
DOL, only two main approaches: a point-to-point measurement approach and an elasticity 
measurement approach. If there was a theory stating clearly the preferred way to construct a 
proxy for DOL, it would be considerably easier to examine the relationships between DOL and 
the gross profitability premium and between DOL and the value premium, potentially 
providing the missing piece that is needed to fully understand the relationships between these 
three. 
 
This paper aims to provide this missing piece by comparing theoretically and empirically the 
two main approaches to construct a proxy for DOL, and from those results to draw a conclusion 
whether the gross profitability premium is truly driven by DOL or something else, and how 
DOL is linked to the value premium.  
 
1.2. Contribution to the literature 
In order to be able to explain the gross profitability premium from a risk-based point of view, 
this paper is a joint test of the preferred way to construct a proxy for the degree of operating 
leverage – as there is no conclusion of the preferred or the most rightful way to construct such 
a proxy in the existing literature – and whether DOL is fundamentally capable of explaining 
the gross profitability premium. Furthermore, Kisser (2014) finds his SGA-based DOL to be 
negatively correlated with the value premium, which is the exact opposite of the view of the 
prior literature, without being capable of explaining the contradiction between his results and 
the results of the prior literature. As a result, the prior literature cannot convincingly explain 
the gross profitability premium from a risk-based view. Therefore, my thesis contributes to the 
existing literature in the following ways: 
 
1) By theoretically and empirically showing that a point-to-point approach, which directly 
approximates the relative size of fixed costs, is the preferred way to be employed when 
constructing a proxy for DOL, whereas elasticity based proxies are shown to be biased. 
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2) Empirically showing that the preferred choice to approximate DOL generates a proxy 
for DOL that is capable of describing the additional risk that is behind the excess returns 
of highly gross profitable firms. 
3) And, providing empirical results stating that the interrelationship between DOL and the 
value premium should be negative, which is in line with the results of Kisser (2014), 
but contradicts with majority of the results of the prior literature. 
4) Providing evidence that the gross profitability premium is strong within industries, but 
rather weak across industries. 
 
As a result, this thesis brings to the literature a view how DOL should be understood, and hence 
approximated, and provide the missing piece that is required to understand the relationships 
between DOL, the gross profitability premium, and the value premium as the results of the 
prior literature provide only an inconsistent view of these relationships.   
 
1.3. Limitations of the study 
There are some obvious problems related to the approach of Kisser (2014) of using SGA 
expenses as a proxy for fixed costs as it does not consider the fixed costs, such as maintenance 
and repairs of production equipment, insurance and safety, licenses, rent and lease expenses, 
which might be included in the cost of goods sold (COGS) as Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) does not determine how firms should allocate expenses between COGS and 
SGA, thus the discretion of such is left for firms (Weil et al., 2014). For that reason, SGA does 
not perfectly represent fixed costs. Additionally, as Novy-Marx (2011) points out, accounting 
practices vary across-industries, thus possibly weakening the reliability of cross-sectional 
results regarding the association between SGA-based DOL and the gross profitability premium. 
However, these across-industry differences in accounting policies do not interfere when 
studying the intra-industry context. Furthermore, there does not currently exist any alternative 
mean that is fundamentally equal to approximate fixed costs by using a point-to-point 
measurement approach, but the approach employing SGA expenses. For that reason, it is 
difficult to build a reliable robustness checks for the empirical findings. 
 
The approximation of DOL by using a time-series regression approach by following the 
example of García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010) effectively requires each firm to have at least 
six years of financial data available. This reduces the amount of monthly observations, but 
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should not affect the empirical results, as the reduction of observations should be evenly 
distributed among the firms within the sample. On the other hand, this procedure effectively 
removes all observations from the sample that have five years or less of active recorded 
operating history, hence mitigating the survival bias (García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010). 
 
1.4. Main findings 
In my research I provide empirical evidence on the degree of operating leverage being the key 
risk factor behind the gross profitability premium. I show that DOL increases the risk of a firm, 
but when higher profitability is enabled by higher DOL (e.g., more favorable cost structure to 
reduce the unit total cost), the total risk actually decreases causing the market value of that 
particular firm to go up. Consequently, the traditional risk factors are unable to price that risk 
of relatively higher fixed costs, but covered by profitability. Therefore, as predicted, I show a 
positive association between DOL, gross profitability, and expected returns, while showing 
that gross profitability and DOL are negatively linked to the value premium and book-to-
market ratio.  
 
I also show that these results are highly sensitive to the definition of DOL, and thus the 
approach used for approximating it, as fixed costs are not directly observable. I show that 
majority of the methods used in the prior research, namely the methods applying an elasticity 
measurement approach or using total costs as a proxy for DOL, to approximate DOL are more 
linked to measuring the risk related to low operating margins, which is much of the risk that is 
described by the value premium as low margin firms tend to have high B/M ratios (Carlson et 
al., 2004; Zhang, 2005). These methods are biased with the size of variable costs, as higher 
unit variable cost can effectively lower the margins, and hence falsely increase the DOL 
estimates, even though there is a concurrent increase in the proportion of variable costs, which 
means lower estimates for DOL when considering the definition of DOL. This is obviously 
contradictory. By employing a proxy for DOL that is independent of the size of margins, I am 
empirically able to confirm the predictions on the associations between DOL, book-to-market, 
and gross profitability. As such a proxy, I employ the DOL measure defined by Kisser (2014), 
which effectively is sales, general, and administrative expenses divided by total book assets.  
 
Furthermore, I show that gross profitability premium is stronger within industries than across 
industries, as different industries have different cost structures, and investors, when setting up 
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their earnings expectations, are indifferent to these variations across industries. The result is 
similar to what Novy-Marx (2011) finds out regarding the value premium, in which the 
investors do not care about the differences in book-to-market ratios between different 
industries.  
 
1.5. Structure 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
relevant theory behind the profitability premium and the different approaches to measure of 
the degree of operating leverage. Section 3 presents the hypotheses and the rationale behind 
them. Section 4 describes the data and the methodology used in this paper. Section 5 presents 
the empirical results. Section 6 provides the robustness checks relevant to the main study. And 
finally, Section 7 concludes the key findings.  
 
1.6. Key terminology on operating leverage 
As fixed costs, and hence operating leverage are not directly observable, a proxy is needed. 
The prior literature includes several different ways to approximate the degree of operating 
leverage, which makes the field of proxies somewhat diverse. Consequently, I define below 
the usage of the terminology regarding the different proxies of operating leverage used in this 
paper. Firstly, operating leverage is intuitively defined as the proportion of fixed operating 
costs relative to the proportion variable operating costs (Lev, 1974). Secondly, degree of 
operating leverage (DOL) describes the magnitude of the operating leverage. In this paper, I 
refer to plain DOL when generally talking about the true, unobservable operating leverage and 
its magnitude without taking a stand on any specific method used in the proxy construction. 
Thus, such a plain DOL describes the operating leverage and its magnitude from the point of 
view of the intuitive definition. On the other hand, when referring to a certain approach to 
approximate DOL and its output value, I use subscripts to further define the specific 
approximation approach used for attaining the proxy for DOL. For instance, if I referred to a 
DOL value approximated by using EBITDA, I would refer to such an estimate of DOL as 
DOLEBITDA. Or, if I used SGA-based DOL, I would use DOLSGA to describe the corresponding 
DOL estimate. Table D1 describes the construction of different DOL proxies. 
10 
 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. The profitability premium 
Earnings, defined as net income excluding extraordinary items, has predictive power on 
average returns in cross-section (Ball and Brown, 1968). Following research, however, 
suggests that earnings have only a little value adding information after controlling for size and 
book-to-market (see e.g., Fama and French, 1996, 2008). Novy-Marx (2013) suggests that 
gross profitability (measured by sales minus cost of goods sold), as the cleanest accounting 
measure of true economic profitability, has more power to predict average returns than 
earnings, and has roughly the same predictive power than book-to-market. His intuition is that 
the measure of gross profitability is not polluted by investments that are treated as expenses 
(e.g., research and development, sales and advertising, and human capital), and hence affect 
the earnings measure. Such expenses, if included in the profitability measure, would give a 
biased view on firm’s profitability as they potentially affect the future profitability of the firm 
through, for example, increased human capital, i.e., learning. Also, Liu et al. (2009) and Hou 
et al. (2014) provide support for Novy-Marx’s (2013) findings of the positive interrelationship 
between profitability and subsequent returns. They use a neoclassical q-theory model and 
report a positive association between profitability and required rates of return.  
 
Ball et al. (2015), on the other hand, argues that bottom line earnings predict future returns as 
well as gross profits after deflating the values correctly. They also find a strong link between 
operating profitability (gross profit minus sales, general, and administrative expenses 
excluding research and development costs, and scaled by total book assets) and subsequent 
stock returns. However, operating profit as a measure of true economic profitability is not 
perfect as it fails to distinguish capitalized sales, general, and administrative expenses (e.g., 
employee incentives, internal communications systems, and other examples of organizational 
capital) from those that relate to generating the sales in a current year. In other words, operating 
profitability includes expensed investments (other than research and development) in 
organizational capital (see e.g., Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013). All in all, the empirical 
evidence suggests unanimously that profitable firms earn higher returns than unprofitable 
firms. 
 
Predictable excess returns can either be due to “rational asset-pricing stories” or “irrational 
asset-pricing stories” (Fama and French, 1992). As the literature related to the profitability 
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premium represents a fairly new line of research, the literature related to the topic is sparse, 
thus causing the absence of real consensus about the factors determining the profitability 
premium. So far, the approaches of the previous literature struggle considerably on reconciling 
the empirical findings regarding the gross profitability premium with a risk-based explanation. 
The model of Carlson et al. (2004), which linearly relates operating leverage to B/M ratio, for 
example, predicts lower operating leverage, lower risk, and lower expected returns for higher 
profitability. In their model, as the unit demand decreases, the equity value of the firm 
decreases, increasing the B/M ratio, thus increasing the operational leverage, risk, and expected 
returns, while margins and, consequently, the profitability sinks.  
 
Zhang (2005), on the other hand, with a neoclassical model expects a divergent exposure to the 
economic risk for high and low profitability firms. His approach uses merely assets-in-place, 
and assumes that those assets are difficult to reduce due to costly reversibility and 
countercyclical price of risk, hence causing those assets-in-place to be riskier than growth 
opportunities. This phenomenon is more critical to low profitability firms as their assets are 
more likely to be in unprofitable use in an economic downturn than the assets of highly 
profitable firms, hence implying that low profitability firms should carry more risk, and thus 
earn higher returns than high profitability firms. Nevertheless, the intuition of Zhang (2005) is 
consistent with the idea of the value premium pricing the risk related to low profitable firms, 
but the existence of gross profitability premium cannot be reconciled by his model.  
 
Whereas Lettau and Wachter (2007) proposes a model that employs a duration-based approach, 
in which short-duration assets are considered riskier than long-duration assets. In this 
framework, value firms are short-duration assets, whose valuation depends on shocks in cash 
flows, whereas growth firms are long-duration assets with valuations depending more on the 
changes in discount rates. And, as investors seem to be more concerned about cash flows than 
discount rates, making value firms riskier from the investors’ point of view, hence causing the 
value premium. The problem of this approach arises with the presence of the gross profitability 
premium, as a highly profitable firms tend to be growth firms according to Novy-Marx (2013), 
thus predicting the opposite, as according to the empirical findings highly profitable firms seem 
to earn significantly higher returns than low profitability firms. Novy-Marx (2013) sums up 
that it is difficult to explain the profitability premium with existing models and approaches as 
highly profitable firms tend to have lower B/M ratios, they are less prone to risk, their cash 
flow durations are longer, and they have lower degrees of operating leverage. It is noteworthy 
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that this paper argues with the last statement of Novy-Marx (2013) regarding the level of 
operating leverage, as the proxy for DOL Novy-Marx (2013) uses can be considered as noisy 
due to the inclusion of variable costs.  
 
As a competing alternative to a risk-based explanation the existing literature suggests that 
profitability could be due to market irrationality emanating from factors such as behavioral 
biases, market frictions, and limits to arbitrage (see e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1994; Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003). In line with Lakonishok et al. (1994) Wang and Yu (2013) argues that low 
profitability firms suffer from overpricing as investors tend to have unjustifiably high 
expectations for low profitability firms, which consequently causes low subsequent returns 
giving arise for the profitability premium. The explanations based on market irrationality, 
nonetheless, violate the efficient market hypothesis. And, as the markets are efficient on 
average, anomalies based on irrationality should disappear as investors learn and exploit the 
anomalies in search of excess returns. Thus, Ball et al. (2015) argues that an explanation based 
on market irrationality seems inconsistent as the existence of profitability premium, has been 
persistent over time, and mispricing due to frictions are not likely to persist for long time 
periods. 
 
Kisser (2014) finds indicative results for a risk-based explanation on the gross profitability 
premium. He finds that operating leverage, measured as sales, general, and administrative 
expenses relative to total assets by a large degree explains the excess returns of those gross 
profitable firms. He also finds that operating leverage is not related to the value premium, 
contrarily to what is suggested by the previous literature (see e.g., Carlson et al., 2004; García-
Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010; Novy-Marx, 2011). And, thus value firms do not have higher 
levels of operating leverage than growth firms as theories linking the value premium and 
operating leverage propose. Nevertheless, Kisser (2014) cannot explain why his results are the 
opposite of the prior literature concerning the association between DOL and the value 
premium. 
 
Furthermore, Novy-Marx (2013) argues that profitability is the other side of value, as his 
empirical findings signal that controlling for profitability considerably increases the 
performance of value strategies. He rationalizes this result by assuming both strategies having 
the same ultimate aim: acquiring productive capacity cheaply. Profitability strategies obtains 
this goal by acquiring productive assets by selling less productive assets, whereas value 
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strategies obtain the goal by financing the purchase of inexpensive assets by selling expensive 
assets. He reports a negative correlation between the two strategies. In other words, he finds 
that the value premium and the gross profitability premium are negatively related.   
 
2.2. The degree of operating leverage 
Operating leverage describes the proportional interrelationship between fixed operating costs 
and variable operating costs (Lev, 1974). A firm with high degree of operating leverage has a 
high proportion of its operating costs as fixed, hence its costs do not adjust as effectively in a 
short-term when a negative market shock arises. According to the operating leverage 
hypothesis a firm having a higher degree of operating leverage should carry more risk, which 
should be reflected by investors’ required return as the operating leverage amplifies the 
exposure to economic risk, and thus increases the sensitivity of earnings in relation to sales 
(see e.g., Hamada, 1972; Rubinstein, 1973; Lev, 1974; Bowman, 1979; García-Feijóo and 
Jorgensen, 2010; Novy-Marx, 2011).  
 
For instance, Lev (1974), Mandelker and Rhee (1984), and Carlson et al. (2004) propose 
theoretically that operating leverage increases the systematic risk of a firm. Empirical findings 
of, for example, García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010) and Novy-Marx (2011) have confirmed 
the positive association between their measures of DOL and expected returns. However, the 
literature, including García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010) and Novy-Marx (2011), has linked 
operating leverage to the value premium. For instance, Novy-Marx (2011) reports a positive 
relation between book-to-market ratio and operating leverage to be strong and monotonic 
within industries, but weak and non-monotonic in a cross-section. García-Feijóo and Jorgensen 
(2010) find similar evidence on the positive correlation between operating leverage and the 
value premium. These two papers, nonetheless, represent the two different lines of the related 
literature regarding the approach to measure the degree of operating leverage; the approach of 
Novy-Marx (2011) represents a point-to-point measurement, whereas the approach of García-
Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010) represents a time-series regression-based elasticity measurement. 
A point-to-point measurement approach simply employs a certain income statement or balance 
sheet items to come up directly with a proxy for DOL, whereas an elasticity approach measures 
the sensitivity of earnings to sales usually employing time-series regressions. 
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Novy-Marx (2011) proposes a dynamic industry equilibrium model of operating leverage, in 
which operating leverage is a product of geared assets and limited operational flexibility. The 
geared assets or the gearing is defined as the capitalized total costs divided by the capitalized 
operating profits, 𝑉𝐶/𝑉𝐴, meaning that the operating leverage should be higher when production 
is more costly, i.e., profitability is low. The limited operational flexibility is defined as ER >> 
EC, in which beta of revenues is much higher than the beta of total costs, meaning that high 
proportion of fixed costs reduces the ability to adjust costs when the sales go down.  
 
Operating leverage = 𝑉𝐶
𝑉𝐴
 (ER - EC)       (1) 
 
Practically, Novy-Marx uses total operating costs (COGS plus SGA) to total book assets as a 
proxy for operating leverage, even though it would be a better proxy for gearing (𝑉𝐶/𝑉𝐴), hence 
implicitly assuming the gearing and the operational inflexibility to be uncorrelated across firms 
(Novy-Marx, 2011). Here, it is noteworthy that Novy-Marx (2011) involves the effect of 
variable costs in his proxy for DOL. In section Hypothesis Development, I show that the 
approach of including the variable costs is not a theoretically supported method, while Kisser 
(2014) provides empirical evidence for my prediction.  
 
The traditional elasticity-based definition of the degree of operating leverage, an elasticity of 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) with respect to sales (S) (see e.g., Dugan and Shriver, 
1989), resembles more the approach taken by García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010).  
 
 𝐷𝑂𝐿 =  𝜕𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝜕𝑆  x 
𝑆
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇       (2) 
 
Their paper is the most recent paper using an elasticity approach. This particular method they 
are using is based on the work of Mandelker and Rhee (1984), which approximates DOL by 
running a simple time-series regression of EBIT on sales, and using the regression coefficient 
as a proxy of DOL. O'Brien and Vanderheiden (1987) argues that this particular method 
proposed by Mandelker and Rhee (1984) generates DOL estimates converging too much 
towards one. O'Brien and Vanderheiden (1987) reasons that this problem can be solved by 
detrending the time-series. And, this particular adjustment for growth in time-series is also 
employed by García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010).  
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Interestingly, the results attained by Novy-Marx (2011) and García-Feijóo and Jorgensen 
(2010) do differ from each other in one significant way: When Novy-Marx (2011) tests the risk 
captured by his measure of DOL, including book-to-market ratio, effectively the value factor, 
as control, does not remove the positive and statistically significant contribution of operating 
leverage to expected returns. Whereas the economical and the statistical significance of the 
DOL proxy used by García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010) disappears when adding a control for 
value. These divergent results may indicate that those estimates of DOL, approximated by 
using completely different approaches, capture somewhat different risk. 
 
Due to unobservable nature of true operating leverage, approximating DOL is highly method 
sensitive. The prior literature includes some research regarding different methods. Firstly, 
Dugan and Shriver (1989) argues that a time-series regression-based elasticity measure is 
theoretically the most consistent way of approximating the degree of operating leverage as it 
takes into account the flow measures, sales and EBIT, relevant to the traditional elasticity-
based definition of the degree of operating leverage. They further argue that the modification 
proposed by O'Brien and Vanderheiden (1987) generates more consistent DOL estimates in 
relation to the classical ex ante model than the method of Mandelker and Rhee (1984) (Dugan 
and Shriver, 1992). Lord (1998), on the other hand, finds that this time-series regression 
approach by O'Brien and Vanderheiden (1987) is the most volatile method being most likely 
exposed to the fluctuations in operating parameters, such as unit price, unit variable cost, or 
periodic fixed cost. Lord (1998) also points out the obvious danger of an elasticity measure 
approach: a tendency to assign high DOL estimates for firms, which are operating close to their 
break-even points, i.e., firms either generating small operating profits or small operating losses. 
Figure 1 portrays this problem of elasticity-based DOL estimates converging towards infinity 
when operating with low positive operating margins (and towards negative infinity when 
operating below the break-even point), towards one when firm is operating far above the break-
even point, or zero when the firm is operating far below the break-even point. Lord (1995) 
stresses also that when using an elasticity approach and substituting variable costs for fixed 
costs (cost trade-off) at certain rate, the degree of operating leverage remains unaltered, which 
obviously is counter-intuitive as, for example, substituting variable costs for fixed costs should 
increase the risk through increased earnings sensitivity to sales and higher fixed costs in 
absolute terms.  
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Additionally, the literature has not considered the effect of capital investment activity through 
depreciation and amortization in the traditional elasticity measurement approach of DOL. As 
higher level of investments implies higher depreciations and amortizations (D&A), and as the 
traditional elasticity approach to estimate DOL employs EBIT sensitivity to sales, EBIT is truly 
affected by the level of D&A, thus falsely increasing the estimated DOL values. This, on the 
other hand, leads to a contradicting conclusion, in which higher DOL should imply higher 
returns, but higher capital investments should imply lower returns (see Berk et al., 1999). This 
paper considers this defect by constructing a new elasticity-based proxy for the degree of 
operating leverage by using EBITDA to sales sensitivity instead, thus eliminating the potential 
distorting effect of capital investment activity to results.  
 
Figure 1: Behavior of elasticity measure of DOL across different levels of sales 
Figure exhibits the convergence of the degree of operating leverage towards infinity in the proximity of break-even point (BE), 
when unit price, unit variable cost, and fixed costs are held constant, and only quantity sold (Q) is allowed to vary. The vertical-
axis describes the degree of operating leverage, measured by using an elasticity measure. The horizontal-axis describes the 
quantity sold, and thus indirectly describes the size of operating margin. 
 
 
 
Using a proxy for fixed costs to approximate operating leverage is not new to the literature (see 
e.g., Carlson et al., 2004; Zhang, 2005). Carlson et al. (2004) and Zhang (2005) find risk and 
expected returns increasing with operating leverage. They also report a positive association 
between operating leverage and the value premium, meaning that higher operating leverage 
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increases risk, hence lowering the equity value and increasing the B/M ratio. Kisser (2014) is 
the latest to employ such a fixed cost point-to-point measurement approach. He uses explicit 
sales, general, and administration (SGA) expenses as a proxy for operating leverage whereas 
Novy-Marx (2011) uses the sum of COGS and SGA expenses as a proxy for operating leverage. 
Kisser finds a strong link between his measure of operating leverage and risk and returns. 
Interestingly he also reports results indicating that there is a negative correlation between 
operating leverage and the value premium, which exactly the opposite to the empirical findings 
of the previous literature (see e.g., Carlson et al., 2004; Zhang, 2005; García-Feijóo and 
Jorgensen, 2010; Novy-Marx, 2011). However, the disadvantage of such a SGA-based proxy 
for fixed costs, and hence for operating leverage, is that SGA does not necessarily consider all 
the fixed-like costs that are potentially included in cost of goods sold (COGS).1 Whereas a 
time-series regression approach, for example employed by García-Feijóo and Jorgensen 
(2010), implicitly considers all the fixed costs, also the fixed-like costs included in COGS. 
Similarly to the results of Kisser (2014) it is particularly interesting when García-Feijóo and 
Jorgensen (2010) apply the methodology of Gulen et al, 2011 to estimate DOL at the portfolio 
level and attain a negative relation between DOL and B/M. Despite of the supporting 
arguments and defects recognized on each approach taken to approximate the operating 
leverage, the discussion about the most correct method has definitely not reached the 
conclusion yet.  
 
3. Hypothesis development    
3.1. The association between operating leverage and risk  
It intuitively makes sense to think about a degree of operating leverage both as a risk factor 
and a determinant of high profitability, as high DOL enables both high gross profitability and 
high risk. Let us first examine the channels the operating leverage affects the risk, and then 
intuitively relate DOL to gross profitability. A high DOL firm has high fixed operating costs 
relative to variable operating costs, thus having a larger portion of its costs in a form that does 
not adjust efficiently downwards when a negative market shock hits. For instance, such a 
                                                 
1 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) does not determine how firms should allocate expenses 
between COGS and SGA, thus the allocation decision is largely at the discretion of firms (Weil et al., 2014). Thus, 
it is highly likely that SGA excludes some of the important fixed operating costs. Examples of such fixed costs 
could be related to maintenance and repairs of production equipment, insurance and safety, licenses, and rent and 
lease expenses. 
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negative shock may decrease the unit sales (Q), decrease the unit price (p), or increase the unit 
variable cost (VC), hence making it more difficult to cover the fixed costs.  
 
A firm may have a high DOL for two reasons, it either trades-off variable costs to fixed costs, 
for example, by increasing the level of automation in manufacturing, and hence reducing a unit 
variable cost while increasing the proportion of fixed costs out of total costs. Or it can increase 
its fixed costs while not affecting the unit variable cost. This is the case, for instance, when a 
firm increases its sales personnel. Also higher DOL may indicate higher break-even point (the 
amount of sales, in which both the variable and fixed costs are fully covered), which obviously 
is a risk factor, since the firm needs more sales to become profitable. Cost trade-off may 
increase the break-even point if the unit total cost, defined here as variable plus fixed costs 
divided by the quantity sold, increases through the execution of cost trade-off.2 Whereas 
increasing non-production fixed costs, such as sales personnel, undoubtedly increases the 
break-even point. Moreover, cost trade-off makes earnings to be more sensitive to sales in 
absolute terms as an incremental unit sales increases earnings more for a firm with low variable 
costs than for a firm with high variable costs. But this is coupled with the possibility of quickly 
accumulating losses for a firm with relatively high fixed costs versus a firm with relatively low 
fixed costs when the sales plummet and cannot cover the fixed costs. In other words, a firm 
with a high DOL has operationally levered earnings, and hence carries more risk than firm with 
a low DOL. Increasing the break-even point, on the other hand, makes earnings to become 
more sensitive in relative terms, as the reference point, from which the earnings change (i.e., 
the break-even point) is at a higher level.  
 
Either way, increasing fixed costs increases DOL, as the proportion of fixed costs out of total 
costs increases. This means that a relatively larger portion of firm’s costs cannot be adjusted 
downwards in case of a negative market shocks in a short-term, hence making the firm less 
operationally flexible, and in effect increasing the firm’s risk exposure. However, the important 
difference between increasing DOL through cost trade-off and plainly increasing the amount 
of fixed costs is how gross profitability is affected. Cost trade-off from variable costs to fixed 
costs by definition increases gross profitability, whereas increasing fixed costs, but not 
                                                 
2 The change of a break-even point depends on how the unit total cost changes – if a cost trade-off manages to 
lower the unit total cost at the current level of sales, then the break-even point would actually decline - but this 
would not remove the risk from increased sensitivity of earnings to sales nor the higher fixed costs in absolute 
terms. 
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affecting the unit variable cost, has no impact on gross profitability. This logic indicates that 
the gross profitability premium is be merely linked to the cost trade-off channel of DOL, while 
the operating profitability premium recognized by Ball et al. (2015) is linked generally to high 
DOL firms that are highly profitable even after covering the fixed costs. The predictions 
regarding how different channels of risk of DOL affect different profitability measures are not 
in the scope of this paper.   
  
As I showed, DOL affects the risk via higher absolute fixed costs, higher absolute sensitivity 
of earnings to sales though cost trade-off, and potentially higher break-even point. 
Consequently, firms with relatively higher fixed costs should carry more risk than firms with 
relatively lower fixed costs. Thus, high DOL firms should earn higher returns than low DOL 
firms. To demonstrate how the risk associated with DOL formally affects the risk of a firm, I 
build a model of operating leverage as a risk factor following the work of Carlson et al. (2004) 
and Novy-Marx (2011). Their approaches both involve a real options model, in which the value 
of the firm is the sum of currently deployed assets and growth options, V = VA + VG, where 
the subscripts A and G denote assets-in-place and growth options, respectively. The exposure 
to the underlying risk factors defines the expected returns of the firm. And, this particular risk 
exposure can be expressed as a value weighted sum of the risk loadings in firm’s assets-in-
place and growth options: 
 
E  = 𝑉𝐴𝑉  EA + 
𝑉𝐺
𝑉
 EG,        (3) 
 
where VA = VR – VVC – VFC. Here VA denotes the capitalized value of assets-in-place, which can 
further be divided into the capitalized value of revenues less the capitalized value of variable 
costs and fixed costs, contrary to Novy-Marx (2011), who does not separate variable costs from 
fixed costs. This approach is analogical to determining the value of equity by subtracting the 
value of debt from the value of assets. Assets, VA, are exposed to the underlying risks through 
a value-weighted average of the exposures of the capitalized revenues, capitalized variable 
costs, and capitalized fixed costs: 
 
EA = ER + 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝑉𝐴  (ER - EVC ) + 
𝑉𝐹𝐶
𝑉𝐴
 (ER - EFC ).     (4) 
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According to the intuition of Carlson et al. (2004), growth options are usually riskier than 
revenues generated from deployed capital in real options models, however, the presence of 
operating costs, more specifically fixed operating costs, allows the deployed assets to be riskier 
than growth options. Variable costs, VVC, by definition vary with sales, and when assuming the 
constant level of variable unit cost, the beta of variable costs equals to the beta of revenues. 
Furthermore, if fixed costs are assumed not to vary with sales, making the beta of fixed costs 
effectively equal to zero. These assumptions regarding the sensitivities of variable costs and 
fixed costs relative to sales are perfectly reasonable in a short-term, thus reducing the equation 
(4) as follows: 
EA = [ER (1 +  
𝑉𝐹𝐶
𝑉𝐴
 )]        (5) 
 
In equation (5), the total risk of assets-in-place is determined by the beta of revenues, which is 
magnified by the amount capitalized fixed costs relative to capitalized value of assets-in-place. 
The equation (5) is equivalent to the definition of DOL of Novy-Marx (2011), with an 
important distinction of not being affected by variable costs (see the equation 1). However, if 
we assumed that EFC was not zero but small, then the risk of assets-in-place would be described 
as (𝑉𝐹𝐶/𝑉𝐴) (ER - EFC ), in which the risk arises from the actual amount of fixed costs relative 
to the size of a firm, measured by total book assets, and from the adaptability of fixed costs to 
changes in sales. However, if the time period is short enough, then EFC is virtually zero. Further 
in this paper, such a beta is assumed to be zero or to lie very close to zero. As a consequence, 
the risk from operating leverage could be described as the relative size of fixed costs, 𝑉𝐹𝐶/𝑉𝐴. 
Using a similar interpretation as Novy-Marx (2011), fixed costs (FC) to total book assets (AT) 
should be a valid proxy for the capitalized fixed costs to capitalized assets-in-place, and hence 
for operating leverage. Thus, within any given industry a relatively high FC/AT should predict 
a relatively high level of fixed costs compared to peers, and likely as a consequence a high 
proportion of fixed costs out of total costs when operating close to break-even point, and high 
degree of cost trade-off from variable operating costs to fixed variable costs. This prediction 
applies only within industries as different industries have their own characteristic levels for 
fixed costs-to-total book assets.   
 
Hence the total risk of a firm can be expressed as follows consisting of the risk exposure to the 
assets-in-place through operating fixed costs and the risk exposure to growth opportunities: 
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E = 𝑉𝐴
𝑉
 [ER (1 +  
𝑉𝐹𝐶
𝑉𝐴
 )] +  
𝑉𝐺
𝑉
 EG.      (6) 
 
The first term of the equation (6) equals to the book-to-market ratio in the model employed by 
Carlson et al. (2004), and the equation predicts that the book-to-market ratio contributes to the 
total risk along with the fixed operating costs and the growth opportunities. And, as the market 
value of equity is dependent on profitability, the model predicts that (VA/V) captures the risk 
related to low margins. The model, most importantly, proposes that the operating leverage 
contributes to the overall risk through the relative size of fixed costs alongside with the book-
to-market ratio, and the size of the firm, which are the well-known risk factors (see e.g., Fama 
and French, 1992, 1993). This prediction implies, that the operating leverage should capture 
the risk related to limited operational flexibility, which cannot be captured by B/M ratio. 
Deciphering from the hypothesis of operating leverage being the risk factor behind the 
profitability premium, it seems intuitive that the value factor fails to capture the risk associated 
with the firms with high profitability as they have higher valuations (lower B/M ratios). This 
might be the reality especially when the high profitability is enabled by large production 
investments implying large fixed costs, in other words, high operating leverage.  
 
This paper employs empirical tests to examine whether there is a link between the gross 
profitability premium and the operating leverage, and whether the gross profitability premium 
co-exists with the value premium and the size premium (an anomaly, in which small firms tend 
to generate higher returns than large firms – see e.g., Banz, 1981) as the model predicts. It is 
also noteworthy that the model gives a prediction on the interrelationship between the operating 
leverage and the value premium. Higher operating leverage causes higher risk, thus causing 
upward pressure on the book-to-market ratios. Nonetheless, in the case of a profitable firm, the 
ratio decreases as well resulting in a puzzling situation, in which the association between DOL 
and the value premium depends on which affects more on the B/M ratio: higher profitability 
increasing equity values or higher risk decreasing equity values. If profitability premium is 
directly linked to DOL, and profitability is negatively related to B/M as Novy-Marx (2013) 
suggests, then the profitability should increase the valuations more than the incremental risk 
decreases them, hence causing a negative relationship observed by Kisser (2014). And, this 
extra risk, not captured by the value factor, might be the one causing the gross profitability 
premium. As a consequence, the formal hypotheses of this paper are as follows: 
 
22 
 
H1: High gross profitability is associated with high DOL, while DOL being the real risk factor 
causing the gross profitability premium.  
 
Note that H1 states that both risk and returns should increase monotonically with DOL. But as 
high DOL companies can be unprofitable as well, the positive and monotonic relationships 
between gross profitability and risk, and hence returns, are not predicted by this model. 
Intuitively the gross profitability premium captures the increased risk from high DOL that 
cannot be captured by the value factor due to high valuations, thus DOL being the risk factor 
behind the profitability premium. The rest of the non-methodological hypotheses are as 
follows: 
 
H2: If H1 is proved to be right, then there should be a negative relation between DOL and the 
value premium. 
 
Novy-Marx (2011) shows that investors price only within industry variation in book-to-market 
ratios, whereas not pricing the across-industry variation in B/M due to different capital 
intensities across industries. Similarly, I expect that the gross profitability premium is stronger 
within industries than across industries, as it is natural that different industries have distinctive 
characteristics regarding cost allocation, and investors are indifferent to these differences 
across industries, whereas within industries differences in DOL might signal different level of 
risk. 
 
H3: The gross profitability premium is stronger within industries than across industries. 
 
3.2. Preferred choice of the proxy for operating leverage 
The operating leverage should magnify the exposure of a firm to economic risk, as profits can 
be understood as levered claims on revenues (Novy-Marx, 2013). Therefore, a firm being more 
exposed to economic risk, and thus having more levered profits relative to revenues, should 
have higher operating leverage. I compose a simplified back-of-an-envelope example to 
demonstrate the behavior of operating leverage measure constructed by using the traditional 
elasticity-based definition of the degree of operating leverage presented in the equation (2) with 
a slight modification of using EBITDA instead of EBIT. In the example, presented in Table 1, 
the starting point is a perfect competition with equal market shares each firm initially selling a 
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quantity of one (Q = 1), the unit price of a good is assumed to be one at time t. It is further 
assumed that at time t, all four firms are exact copies of each other, all equaling to firm A. The 
only change that is assumed to happen between t and t+1 is the cost allocation between variable 
and fixed costs and the technology selection decisions reflected by the varying unit total costs. 
The decisions are different to each firm, in other words, the four different firms employ 
different strategies in operating cost allocation between variable costs and fixed costs with 
varying technologies. Firm A decides to do nothing at all, while three other firms switch part 
of their variable costs to fixed costs. Let us first examine firms A and B, whose total costs, and 
thus the break-even points as well are indifferent of the choice of cost allocation. The example 
of A and B describes the perfect cost trade-off from variable to fixed costs, in which at the 
current level of sales (Q = 1) the total costs for both firms stay the same. Nonetheless, the cost 
allocation affects the sensitivity of EBITDA relative to sales, firm B having four times more 
sensitive earnings in absolute terms relative to firm A. Note that the losses in absolute terms 
would accumulate four times faster for firm B if the sales dropped below the break-even point, 
which in this example is built to be one for both firms. When employing the traditional 
elasticity-based definition of DOL, which measures the proportional changes of earnings 
relative to the proportional changes in sales, the equal estimates for DOL are assigned for both 
A and B, even though investors of B most probably should require higher returns for their 
investment in order to have firm B in their portfolios.  
 
Firms C and D describe similar firms as B, but with different production technologies. Firm C 
has the equal fixed costs as firm B, but it has not managed to decrease its unit variable cost to 
as low level as B, thus having higher total costs and a higher break-even point. The case with 
the firm D is the opposite, with better manufacturing technology it has managed to lower its 
total costs at the given level of sales, and thus the break-even point. The variation in DOL 
estimates close to the break-even point is clearly visible with the firms C and D, the DOL 
estimates increasing closer to the break-even point. When examining all the four firms, the 
example shows that the elasticity measure of DOL is capable of capturing the risk that is related 
to the proximity of the break-even point, in other words, the elasticity measure of DOL predicts 
higher risk for a firm closer to the break-even, but it cannot capture the increased absolute 
sensitivity of earnings to sales nor the increased absolute fixed costs as the case with firms A 
and B shows. Furthermore, the example of firms C and D shows how an elasticity measure of 
DOL is sensitive to changes in total costs, even though the change comes from a change in unit 
variable cost, which according to my model of operating leverage should not affect DOL, but 
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rather the margins. Higher DOL due to higher unit variable cost contradicts also with the 
fundamental intuition of operating leverage. And, the increase in risk due to lower margins 
should be priced by the value premium as Carlson et al. (2004) and Zhang (2005) predict – but 
not priced by the gross profitability premium especially when lower margins arise from higher 
unit variable cost. The break-even point plays such an important role with an elasticity measure 
of DOL, since the earnings’ sensitivity to sales becomes clearly higher the closer the reference 
point, i.e., the point of zero earnings (the break-even point), is. 
 
Table 1: Behavior of elasticity measure of DOL close to a break-even point 
A simplified back-of-an-envelope example to describe the behavior of the elasticity measure of the degree of operating 
leverage (DOL) when firms have different cost allocation between variable costs and fixed costs and with varying 
technological capability reflected by the amount of unit total cost. The example assumes one market with only one product. 
The starting point is a perfect competition with equal market shares and each firm having the quantity sold (Q) initially one, 
the unit price of a good is assumed to be one at time t. It is further assumed that at time t, all four firms are exact copies of 
each other, all equaling to firm A in the table below. The only change that is assumed to happen between t and t+1 is the cost 
allocation and technology selection decisions that are different to each firm, the firm A deciding to do nothing at all. The table 
presents how those decisions affect gross profitability, total costs, the break-even point, and DOL estimates measured 
according to the traditional elasticity-based definition of DOL (the elasticity of earnings to sales, but using EBITDA instead 
of EBIT): 𝐷𝑂𝐿 =  𝜕𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
𝜕𝑆
 x 𝑆
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
.   
 
Firm               A B C D 
            
Sales        1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Variable costs (% of Sales)    80 % 20 % 30 % 10 % 
  Gross profit             0.20 0.80 0.70 0.90 
Fixed costs       0.20 0.80 0.80 0.80 
            
Total costs       1.00 1.00 1.10 0.90 
Break-even point      1.00 1.00 1.14 0.89 
  EBITDA             0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.10 
            
 A  B  C  D 
Sales EBITDA DOL  EBITDA DOL  EBITDA DOL  EBITDA DOL 
1.00 0.00 Nm  0.00 Nm  -0.10 Nm  0.10 Nm 
1.10 0.02 Nm  0.08 Nm  -0.03 -7.00  0.19 9.00 
1.20 0.04 11.00  0.16 11.00  0.04 Nm  0.28 5.21 
1.30 0.06 6.00  0.24 6.00  0.11 21.00  0.37 3.86 
1.40 0.08 4.33  0.32 4.33  0.18 8.27  0.46 3.16 
1.50 0.10 3.50  0.40 3.50  0.25 5.44  0.55 2.74 
 
The problem highlighted by Lord (1998) considering elasticity-based DOL estimates 
approaching infinity (and negative infinity when operating below the break-even point) very 
close to a break-even point is clearly visible in the example, in which DOL estimates tend to 
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increase towards the break-even. This suggests that the risk, DOL is describing, is the 
proximity of the break-even point, and thus the uncertainty on whether the sign of profits is 
plus or minus. If investors thought that firms operating close to their break-even points (i.e., 
having low or slightly negative margins) were riskier than those operating far above the break-
even point, then empirical tests should document the risk priced to the elasticity-based DOL. 
However, the elasticity measure of DOL in the example does not seem to capture the extra risk 
associated to the cost trade-off decision causing the higher sensitivity of earnings to sales, and 
importantly differences in gross profitability, firm B having considerably higher gross profits 
above the break-even point. The radical prediction here is that at least the operating leverage 
measured by an elasticity measure cannot explain the gross profitability premium. On the 
contrary, a measure of operating leverage capturing the increased sensitivity of earnings 
relative to sales and higher fixed costs, and not being sensitive to the proximity of break-even 
point could be linked to the gross profitability premium. As the example of firm A and B shows 
the cost allocation decision directly affects both the risk and the gross profits implying that a 
more direct measure of fixed costs should perform well in explaining the extra risk that causes 
the gross profitability premium. Therefore, I hypothesize along the lines of the previous section 
regarding the risk of assets-in-place that a point-to-point approach including the fixed costs 
should perform better than an elasticity measure of operating leverage in explaining the gross 
profitability premium.  
 
However, the fixed costs are not directly observable, and thus a proxy is needed. Sales, general, 
and administrative (SGA) expenses used by Kisser (2004), even with its defects, such as 
ineptitude to capture the fixed costs included in costs of goods sold and the lack of consistency 
in allocating costs into SGA, it seems the closest proxy for fixed costs available with the current 
regulation of disclosing financial information, especially as SGA costs tend to be fixed at least 
in a short-term. An alternative approach used in the literature to proxy fixed costs using a point-
to-point measurement is fixed assets-to-total assets ratio, which is usually used for confirming 
the results obtained by using an elasticity measure approach (e.g., García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 
2010). The validity of fixed assets as a proxy of fixed costs might be biased due to the fact that 
fixed costs usually include also other fixed costs than just costs related to fixed assets, such as 
costs related to sales force or general administration. Therefore, the SGA seems to be the 
preferred way of approximating the amount of operating leverage a firm is exposed to. As a 
consequence of the prior reasoning, the hypotheses related to methodologies to approximate 
DOL are as follows:  
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H4: An elasticity measure of DOL captures merely the risk related to the proximity of the 
break-even point, effectively the risk related to the low margins, while not being able to capture 
cleanly the risks fundamentally associated with relatively high fixed costs.    
With H4 it is noteworthy that in the theory of Carlson et al. (2004) regarding the operating 
leverage, the operating leverage, defined to be in direct relationship with book-to-market ratio, 
increases along with the B/M ratio when operating margins and earnings fall, thus predicting 
higher returns for firms with low profitability. This basically predicts that elasticity measure of 
DOL is capable of capturing some of the systematic risk, especially the similar risk that is 
priced by the value premium (see the evidence from García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010). But 
in the light of empirical evidence regarding the gross profitability premium, an elasticity 
measure of DOL cannot explain the gross profitability premium as the elasticity measurement 
approach produces low DOL estimates for firms operating far above their break-even points. 
For that reason, I expect the following hypotheses to be true as well: 
 
H5: Following H4, a point-to-point approach using a direct proxy for fixed costs to 
approximate DOL, more specifically SGA-to-total book assets, should outperform any 
elasticity measure of earnings to sales in capturing the risks associated with relatively high 
fixed costs. 
 
H6: Consequently, it is not possible to link DOL to the profitability premium, if DOL is 
measured by using an elasticity measure. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. Data sample 
I obtain the monthly stock returns and the market values from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). The accounting data is obtained from Compustat. The sample period 
extends from 1962 to 2014 and includes stocks listed in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. 
Consistent with the previous literature (e.g., Fama and French, 1993; García-Feijóo and 
Jorgensen, 2010; Novy-Marx, 2011, 2013; Kisser, 2014), the accounting data (represents firm’s 
financial position at the end of fiscal year t–1) is merged with returns generated between July 
in fiscal year t and June in fiscal year t+1 (assuming that the accounting data is available by 
the end of June in t), market equities (ME) are calculated by using the share price at the end of 
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June in year t, book-to-market ratios (B/M) are calculated by using the market equity at end of 
December in year t–1 and the corresponding book equity at the end of December in year t–1. 
The risk-free rates, monthly market returns, returns on the value, size, and momentum factors 
are obtained from the data library of Kenneth French. 
 
In line with the prior related literature, I exclude financial firms (SIC 6000 – 6999) and utilities 
(SIC 4000 – 4999) and firms with negative book equity from the sample. Moreover, only stocks 
with CRSP and Compustat share codes of 10 or 11 are included in the sample. Along with the 
previous literature, also firms with missing values for book equity, market equity, and valid 
estimate for the operating leverage are excluded.  
 
To mitigate the survivorship bias, I follow the prescriptions of Shumway (1997) and Shumway 
and Warther (1999) to remove the performance effect of firms delisted from CRSP. In line with 
García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010), I use -30 percent as the last monthly return for firms listed 
in NYSE and AMEX and -55 percent as the last monthly return for firms listed in NASDAQ. 
By conducting so, I am able to reduce the impact on results emanating from small, young 
growth stocks. Additionally, by following García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010), I mitigate the 
survival bias. The survival bias is automatically considered, as the availability of financial data 
at least for six years is the minimum requirement for a firm to be included in the data sample, 
as that is the amount of data needed to estimate the elasticity DOL estimates by following the 
methodology of García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010). Also, to mitigate the impact of extreme 
observations to results, I follow the methodology of Fama and French (1992) and Dichev 
(1998) to set the top 95.5 percentile and the bottom 0.5 percentile equal to 95.5 percentile and 
0.5 percentile, respectively. This methodology is applied to monthly stock returns, B/M ratios, 
and operating leverage distributions. 
  
As a result, the final data sample consists of 4,407 firms and 724,324 monthly observations. 
The final data sample is used for tests with all the different DOL estimates. The data sample is 
further summarized in Table 2 and Table 3 of Empirical Results section. Also, the Pearson 
correlation coefficients are presented in the Panel B of Table 2 to show how the different 
variables co-vary in a cross-section. Appendix A further describes the data sample 
characteristics on annual basis (Table A1) and industry-wise (Table A2). 
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Consistent with the prior literature (see e.g., Fama and French, 1993), I use only NYSE stocks 
as portfolio breakpoints in order to avoid sorts that are biased by the large amount of small 
stocks listed in AMEX and NASDAQ. From now on I refer to these breakpoints as NYSE 
breakpoints. 
 
4.2. Methodology   
4.2.1. Defining gross profitability and degree of operating leverage 
Gross profits are defined as sales minus cost of goods sold. Thus, I define the variable for gross 
profitability (GP) as revenues minus cost of goods sold to total book assets similarly to Novy-
Marx (2013). As there is no conclusion in the previous literature on the preferred approach to 
estimate the level of operating leverage, it is required to use both alternatives: a point-to-point 
measurement approach and the elasticity measurement approach based on time-series 
regressions. The point-to-point measurement approach, I employ in this paper, is based on the 
work of Kisser (2014). He uses fixed sales, general, administrative (SGA) expenses as a proxy 
for fixed costs, he scales SGA expenses with total book assets uniformly with the previous 
literature in order to make the operating leverage estimates comparable between firms. 
 
As an elasticity measure in this paper, I employ the approach based on the work of Mandelker 
and Rhee (1984), O'Brien and Vanderheiden (1987), and García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010). 
However, different to the prior literature related to the elasticity measure of operating leverage, 
I will measure the sensitivity of EBITDA to sales instead of the sensitivity of EBIT to sales. 
My hypothesis is that by using EBITDA instead of EBIT, I am able to reduce the effect of 
investment activity on DOL estimates. As amounts of depreciation and amortization neither 
change together with sales, but rather stay as fixed due to their basis on accounting principles, 
nor are actual operating costs, including them into a proxy measuring fixed operating costs 
would probably cause biased results. Otherwise, I will conduct the approximation of DOL 
similarly to the preceding literature. 
 
As I am interested in relating gross profitability to DOL, I need to estimate DOL for each firm 
at the end of each year. By following the prior literature (see Mandelker and Rhee, 1984; 
O'Brien and Vanderheiden, 1987; García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010) will run the regressions 
at five-year overlapping intervals. For that reason, I need financial data for each company at 
least from a period of six years in order to compute the elasticity measure proxies for DOL, 
29 
 
thus effectively reducing the sample size to extend from 1967 to 2014, simultaneously 
mitigating the survival bias mentioned in the section Data sample. Next, I explain the 
estimation method in more detail. 
First, I run the following two regressions to detrend the time-series recommended by the 
previous literature (see e.g., O'Brien and Vanderheiden, 1987; Dugan and Shriver, 1992): 
 
lnEBITDAt = lnEBITDA0 + gebitda + µt, ebitda,     (6) 
 
lnSalest = lnSales0 + gsales + µt, sales,      (7) 
 
in which EBITDA0 and Sales0 represent the starting levels of EBITDA and sales, respectively. 
Terms gebitda and gsales represent the growth trend in EBITDA and sales, respectively, while 
µt,ebitda and µt, sales represent the residuals. I follow the common transformation in accounting 
research to compute the logs of negative earnings (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2005), ln (1 + 
EBITDA) if EBITDA ≥ 0, and –ln (1 – EBITDA) if EBITDA < 0. 
 
Second, I run a regression to estimate the following equation: 
 
µt, ebitda = OL µt, sales + et,       (8)                          
 
where OL is an estimate of DOL and et is an error term. OL measures the average sensitivity 
of the percentage deviation of EBITDA form its trend relative to the percentage deviation of 
sales from its trend.  
 
The elasticity DOL estimates are calculated also by using EBIT instead of EBITDA by 
following the preceding literature (see e.g., Mandelker and Rhee, 1984; O'Brien and 
Vanderheiden, 1987; García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010) for comparison. In this paper, when 
using EBIT to construct a proxy for DOL, I use an abbreviation of DOLEBIT to refer to the 
estimate of DOL that is attained by using EBIT-based approximation. Similarly, DOLEBITDA is 
used when referring to a proxy of DOL attained by using EBITDA.  
 
I use sales, general, and administrative (SGA) expenses to total book assets (AT) as a point-to-
point proxy for DOL similarly to Kisser (2014). I adopt the abbreviation of DOLSGA when 
referring to such a DOL value attained by using SGA/AT as a proxy. DOLTC, another point-
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to-point proxy, refers to an estimate of DOL obtained by dividing total costs (cost of goods 
sold plus sales, general, and administrative expenses) by total book assets equivalently to 
Novy-Marx (2011). As a third point-to-point proxy for DOL, I use book DOL (DOLBook), 
which is the five-year-average of fixed assets (PPENT; property, plant, and equipment) to total 
book assets (García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010). 
 
4.2.2. The power of gross profitability and DOL to predict returns 
In this section, by running Fama-MacBeth regressions (see Fama and MacBeth, 1973), I 
examine whether the gross profitability premium exists in the sample. I also verify here 
whether the evidence of prior literature (see e.g., Novy-Marx, 2011) about the return predicting 
ability of operating leverage holds. Simultaneously, I aim to validate the return predicting 
power of newly constructed proxy for operating leverage using EBITDA sensitivity instead of 
EBIT sensitivity, and compare the risk capturing ability of that particular measurement 
approach to a point-to-point DOL estimate (DOLSGA). Therefore, I run the following regression 
of returns on gross profitability and different operating leverage estimates. 
 
rtj = β’ xtj + etj,        (9) 
 
where β represents the vector of time-series means of slope coefficients for an explanatory 
variable (GP or DOL) and the regression controls, xtj represents the vector of an explanatory 
variable and the regression controls, and etj is an error term. As the regression controls I use 
the logarithm of book-to-market, the logarithm of market equity, and the momentum effect 
measured at the horizons of one month and 12 to 2 months. I hypothesize that both gross 
profitability and different measures of DOL are positive and statistically significant indicating 
a power to explain returns in cross-section, but that power to predict returns is weakened for 
gross profitability when DOL is added as a control variable. 
 
To show further evidence, I conduct two set of regressions according to Fama and French 
(1993) and Carhart (1997), in which the portfolio of stocks is either sorted on gross profitability 
or DOL into quintiles. The portfolios are formed by using NYSE breakpoints, and those are 
rebalanced at the end of each June. The value factor (HML: high-minus-low), size factor (SMB: 
small-minus-big), and the momentum factor (UMD: up-minus-down) are used as controls. 
 
31 
 
  𝑟𝑡𝑒 = αt + βMKT rt, MKT + βMKT SMBt + βHML HMLt +  βUMD UMDt            (10) 
 
Therefore, I should be able show a positive spread in excess returns 𝑟𝑡𝑒 and especially in alphas 
αt between high gross profitability firms and low gross profitability firms and similarly between 
high DOL and low DOL firms. (Novy-Marx, 2013) 
 
4.2.3. The association between the gross profitability premium and DOL 
By following García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010) and Fama and French (1993), I form quintile 
portfolios on size (used for controlling purposes) and gross profitability into 25 portfolios and 
present their average monthly returns and corresponding estimates for operating leverage. 
Portfolios are constructed by using NYSE breakpoints, and they are rebalanced at the end of 
each June. After forming the portfolios, I test the statistical difference of equally weighted 
returns and operating leverages between the highest and the lowest quintile of portfolios sorted 
on gross profitability.   
 
Additionally, by following García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010), I run a cross-sectional 
regression on annual basis of operating leverage on gross profitability at individual firm level 
to examine further the interrelationship between these two. The time series standard errors are 
adjusted for autocorrelation following Loughran and Schultz (2005).  
 
lnDOLt = at + lnMEt + lnB/Mt + lnGPt,               (11) 
 
where lnMEt and lnB/Mt are used as control variables in addition to lnGPt. I perform the 
regression by using various combinations of controls. I follow the common transformation in 
accounting research to compute the logs of negative profitability values (Ljungqvist and 
Wilhelm, 2005), ln (1 + GP) if GP ≥ 0, and –ln (1 – GP) if GP < 0. DOL is set to be a left-hand 
side variable, so that the measurement error can be absorbed by the disturbance term. 
 
To extend the examination of association between gross profitability and DOL, I conduct the 
analysis deployed by Kisser (2014), in which firms are sorted into five quintile portfolios 
according to gross profitability, and regressions are run for each quintile with the following 
controls proposed by Carhart (1997) and adding a control for DOL as well (Kisser, 2014). The 
portfolios are formed by using NYSE breakpoints, and those are rebalanced at the end of each 
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June. The DOL factor uses independent sorts of stocks into two size groups and three DOL 
groups, effectively independent 2x3 sort. As the size breakpoint the NYSE median market 
capitalization is used and the DOL breakpoints are the 30th and the 70th percentiles of DOL 
estimates for NYSE stocks. The DOL factor used in the regression is the average of the two 
high DOL portfolio returns minus the average of the two low DOL portfolio returns. 
 
𝑟𝑡𝑒 = αt + βMKT rt, MKT + βMKT SMBt + βHML HMLt + βMOM MOMt + βDOL DOLt,             (12) 
 
where controls are constructed according to the previous literature. (Fama and French, 1993; 
Carhart, 1997; Kisser, 2014) 
 
4.2.4. The association between the value premium and DOL 
By following Kisser (2014) I will create 25 portfolios (5 x 5) sorted first on gross profitability 
and then on value (B/M) and present the returns and the DOL estimates for each portfolio to 
see the link between DOL and the value premium. Also, I will employ the exactly same 
analysis, but sorting the firms first on value and then on gross profitability to show how the 
results are sensitive to such a change. The first sort measures how DOL varies in book-to-
market within gross profitability sorts, whereas the second sort measures how DOL changes in 
B/M in absolute terms. The portfolios are constructed by using NYSE breakpoints and 
rebalanced at the end of each June. 
 
4.2.5. The gross profitability premium within and across industries 
I also provide supplementary research whether the gross profitability premium is stronger 
within industries than in the cross-section by following the methodology of Novy-Marx (2011), 
in which firms’ gross profitability ranking within industry is used as the intra-industry gross 
profitability measure and the ranking of the gross profitability of firm’s industry is used as the 
industry gross profitability measure. Fama-MacBeth regressions (see Fama and MacBeth, 
1973) are employed in order to measure the risk exposures for within-industry and across-
industry variables (see equation 9). Along with the within- and across-industry measures the 
logarithm of book-to-market, the logarithm of market equity, and the momentum effect 
measured at the horizons of one month and 12 to 2 month are used as control variables. The 
expectation here is that within-industry variable should capture risk better than the across-
industry variable.  
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I further extend this examination of gross profitability effect being stronger within industries 
than across industries similarly to Novy-Marx (2011). Consequently, I create quintile portfolio 
sorts on intra-industry gross profitability and industry gross profitability. The intra-industry 
sort assigns each firm each year to a portfolio based on the firm’s gross profitability relative to 
other firms within the same industry. The industry sort assigns each firm each year to a portfolio 
based on the gross profitability of the firm’s industry (total industry gross profits scaled by 
total industry book assets). Similarly, to Novy-Marx (2011), there are 49 industries defined by 
Fama and French (1997). The Carhart four-factor model (see equation 10) is then employed to 
the portfolios in order to find out whether the model is capable of pricing the risk associated 
with each of the portfolios. I expect to see the within-industry sort generating high excess 
returns and high alphas, whereas across-industry measure sort generating lower and statistically 
less significant excess returns and alphas.  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Preliminary results 
This section provides the initial results regarding the cross-sectional association between the 
degree of operating leverage, the gross profitability, and the value (B/M). First, I provide the 
DOL estimates obtained by using different estimation approaches. Second, I show how these 
proxies for DOL correlate with each other and with other test variables, most interestingly with 
the gross profitability (GP) and the value (B/M), in a cross-section. The data sample and the 
test variables are summarized in Table 2. Also, the Pearson correlation coefficients are 
presented to show how the different variables co-vary in a cross-section.  
 
EBIT-based DOL values obtained from the regressions are similar to those of García-Feijóo 
and Jorgensen (2010) as their average DOL estimate for a time-period extending from 1986 to 
2003 is 3.96, and the corresponding median equals to 1.69. While the EBIT-based DOL mean 
and median are 3.88 and 1.88 in the data sample used in this study, respectively. The minor 
differences arise from using a longer dataset and excluding utilities from the sample. Other 
descriptive statistics are similar to those of García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010). From the table 
one sees that DOL estimates based on EBIT are more sensitive to changes in sales than DOL 
estimates based on EBITDA, as their dispersion is significantly higher. This is natural and 
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predicted ex ante as the EBIT-based DOL includes the magnifying effect emanating from the 
inclusion of depreciation and amortization, which are falsely considered as operating costs by 
the traditional elasticity-based definition of DOL.  
 
The simple Pearson correlation coefficients initially show a positive correlation between 
elasticity measures of DOL and B/M, which is also the main view of the preceding literature 
(see e.g., García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010; Novy-Marx, 2011). Whereas the correlation 
between SGA/AT and B/M seems to be negative, thus having a sign of correlation that is 
aligned with the hypotheses presented in this study. The book DOL measure used by García-
Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010), and defined as the five-year-average of fixed assets divided by 
total book assets, seems to be inversely related to the SGA-based DOL, and correlates 
positively with B/M. The observed correlation with the B/M is in line with the prior literature, 
in which such a book DOL is primarily used as a robustness check. But the observed correlation 
of DOLBook with the SGA-based DOL indicates that fixed assets are not directly linked to the 
true amount of fixed costs, in other words, fixed costs arise by large part from other sources 
than only fixed assets, such as from administration or sales force. The total costs-to-total assets 
proxy for DOL used by Novy-Marx (2011) seems to be positively correlated with B/M, which 
is aligned with his empirical findings. 
 
The descriptive statistics and the correlations between different test variables seem to be well 
aligned with the previous literature. The Pearson correlation coefficients also present very 
interesting initial results regarding the associations between DOL and the gross profitability 
(GP) and between DOL and the value (B/M), and between GP and B/M, which are in the 
interest of this research. It seems that DOLSGA and GP are highly correlated with a Pearson 
correlation coefficient of 0.88. The correlation between GP and B/M in the sample is negative, 
thus being aligned with the findings of Novy-Marx (2013). Also, the correlation between 
DOLSGA and B/M seems to have a negative sign as I predict in this paper, thus the correlation 
being aligned with the results of Kisser (2014). Furthermore, as I predicted, DOL values 
approximated by using an elasticity measure approach seem to incapable of explaining the 
gross profitability premium, the correlations between those EBIT- and EBITDA-based DOL 
values and GP are negative, hence being in line with my hypotheses.  
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Table 2: Summary sample statistics 
The data sample used for estimating the elasticity measure of DOL (using both EBITDA and EBIT sensitivity to changes in 
sales) consists of firms listed in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ and included in Compustat/CRSP merged database over the 
fiscal years 1962-2014.  In order to calculate the elasticity proxies for DOL, I collect the data on sales, earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortizations (EBITDA), and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). I estimate the elasticity 
measures of DOL for fiscal years 1967-2014 by running the regressions at five-year overlapping intervals for each company 
and for each year as follows: 
 
lnEBITDAt = lnEBITDA0 + gebitda + µt, ebitda,     
 
lnSalest = lnSales0 + gsales + µt, sales,      
 
in which EBITDA0 and Sales0 represent the starting levels of EBITDA and sales, respectively, terms gebitda and gsales represent 
the growth trend in EBITDA and sales, respectively, µt, ebitda and µt, sales represent the residuals. I follow the common 
transformation in accounting research to compute the logs of negative earnings (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2005), ln (1 + 
EBITDA) if EBITDA ≥ 0, and –ln (1 – EBITDA) if EBITDA < 0.  
 
Second, I run a regression to estimate the following equation: 
 
µt, ebitda = OL µt, sales + et,                                
 
where OL is an estimate of DOL and et is an error term. OL measures the average sensitivity of the percentage deviation of 
EBITDA from its trend relative to the percentage deviation of sales from its trend. The book-to-market ratio (B/M) is calculated 
by using end-of-fiscal year values from Compustat from 1967 to 2013, and market capitalization (ME) is calculated by using 
at the end of June values in the year following the end of fiscal year. The market data is from CRSP covering the years from 
1967 to 2014. Gross profitability is calculated as follows: sales minus cost of goods sold (COGS) to total book assets (AT). 
DOLEBITDA and DOLEBIT are calculated as described above. DOLSGA is calculated by dividing sales, general, and administrative 
expenses with total book assets. DOLTC is calculated as DOLSGA, but including COGS in the numerator as well. Book DOL is 
the five-year-average of fixed assets to total book assets. The data sample excludes financial firms and utilities, and those firms 
with negative book equity. Also firms with missing values for B/M, ME, or DOL estimates are excluded. Survivorship bias is 
mitigated by following Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999). Also, by following García-Feijóo and Jorgensen 
(2010), the last monthly returns are set to be -30 percent for firms listed in NYSE and AMEX, and -50 percent in NASDAQ. 
Survival bias is mitigated by requiring at least six years of financial data for each firm by following García-Feijóo and 
Jorgensen (2010). Monthly returns, B/M ratios, and DOL estimate distributions are winsorized at 0.5 percent level. The data 
sample consists of 4,407 firms and 724,324 monthly observations. 
 
Panel A: Data sample characteristics             
    Percentile 
Variable   Mean SD 5 % 25 % 50 % 75 % 95 % 
Returns, %  1.53 12.99 -17.63 -5.63 0.53 7.48 23.33 
B/M  0.86 0.74 0.17 0.39 0.65 1.08 2.25 
lnME  5.36 2.28 1.97 3.65 5.19 6.91 9.35 
GP  0.42 0.26 0.11 0.25 0.38 0.54 0.87 
DOLEBITDA 2.60 3.86 0.18 0.79 1.48 2.73 8.76 
DOLEBIT  3.88 6.38 0.19 0.91 1.88 3.90 14.54 
DOLSGA  0.29 0.22 0.04 0.14 0.25 0.39 0.70 
DOLTC  1.24 0.81 0.28 0.73 1.10 1.53 2.69 
DOLBook   0.31 0.20 0.05 0.16 0.27 0.42 0.71 
         
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients for the test variables         
Variable lnB/M lnME lnGP lnDOLEBIT lnDOLEBITDA lnDOLSGA lnDOLTC lnDOLBook 
lnB/M 1.00        
lnME -0.50 1.00       
lnGP -0.22 -0.10 1.00      
lnDOLEBIT 0.12 -0.07 -0.02 1.00     
lnDOLEBITDA 0.15 -0.02 -0.06 0.89 1.00    
lnDOLSGA -0.09 -0.23 0.88 0.09 0.03 1.00   
lnDOLTC 0.17 -0.32 0.49 0.03 0.01 0.51 1.00  
lnDOLBook 0.09 0.10 -0.21 -0.07 0.02 -0.37 -0.12 1.00 
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As correlations only tell how different variables co-vary in a data sample, not telling anything 
about causalities, it is required to examine those relationships between different variables in 
more detail. However, as the signs and the magnitudes of those Pearson correlation coefficients 
between the key variables are as predicted by the hypotheses of this paper, a fruitful setting for 
further research is definitely set up. 
 
5.2. DOL, GP, and the cross-sectional average stock returns 
In this section, I empirically show that both DOL and gross profitability are positively linked 
to stock returns, consequently confirming that my data sample is capable of producing results 
obtained by the prior literature. First, by running firm level regressions by following Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) I examine whether investors require extra returns for gross profitability and 
DOL. Second, by sorting firms into quintile portfolios on gross profitability and DOL, I am 
able to show whether high profitability firms produce higher excess returns than low 
profitability firms and whether high DOL firms produce higher excess returns than their peers 
with lower DOL values. Additionally, by comparing different definitions of DOL, I am able to 
examine whether their capability of explaining returns, and thus risk, differs from each other. 
 
Table 3 presents the results regarding the Fama-MacBeth regressions, and how investors 
require premium for being exposed to certain risk factors. Specifications (1) – (4) involve either 
GP or DOL in addition to the other control variables and specifications (5) and (6) examine the 
risk premium when GP and DOL are employed simultaneously. As control variables I use the 
logarithms of B/M and ME, and the returns for the past month and year. Firstly, the regressions 
indicate that investors actually do require risk premium for being exposed to gross profitability. 
The sign of GP is always positive and significant (excluding the 5th specification in Panel C) 
regardless of the control variables. It is noteworthy that GP is positive and significant even 
after controlling for the value factor B/M, which signals that there is a risk premium associated 
with gross profitability that cannot be captured by B/M, in which (see specification 4) the 
coefficient for GP is 0.54 with a t-statistic of 4.35, meaning that the result is significant at the 
confidence level of 0.1 percent. Secondly, the regressions indicate that the required 
compensation for being exposed to different definitions of DOL seems to have considerably 
more variation in results. In Panel A, the DOL is based on an EBIT elasticity measure, and the 
regression results show that DOLEBIT individually captures some risk premium, the result 
though being statistically insignificant (t-statistic of 1.45). The sign of the coefficient falls 
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negative and the statistical significance drops dramatically when other control variables are 
included in the regression, signaling that DOLEBIT do not very well possess any risk that could 
not be already captured by the control variables.   
 
Table 3: Fama-MacBeth regressions employing gross profitability and degree of 
operating leverage 
Table reports the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of firms’ returns on gross profitability (GP), which is sales minus 
cost of goods sold scaled by total book assets (AT), and the different measures of degree of operating leverage (DOL). 
Logarithms of book-to-market (B/M) and size (ME), and the past returns for one month and one year are used as controls. The 
data sample extends from 1967 to 2014, and excludes financials and utilities. 
 
  Slope coefficients (x102) and [t-statistics] from the regression 
rtj = β’ xtj + etj,  
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth regressions using DOLEBIT     
DOL 0.01  0.00  0.01 0.00 
 [1.45]  [-0.73]   [1.62] [-0.71]  
GP  0.33  0.54 0.34 0.54 
  [2.58]  [4.35] [2.64] [4.33] 
lnB/M   0.34 0.40  0.40 
   [5.22] [6.04]  [5.92] 
lnME   -0.13 -0.12  -0.12 
   [-3.91]  [-3.61]   [-3.61]  
r1,0   -4.58 -4.64  -4.64 
   [-14.52]  [-14.78]   [-14.80]  
r12,2   0.15 0.13  0.12 
   [1.27] [1.10]  [1.07] 
       
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regressions using DOLEBITDA 
DOL 0.01  0.00  0.01 0.00 
 [1.90]  [-0.49]   [1.96] [-0.51]  
GP  0.33  0.54 0.32 0.54 
  [2.58]  [4.35] [2.53] [4.31] 
lnB/M   0.35 0.40  0.40 
   [5.30] [6.04]  [6.00] 
lnME   -0.13 -0.12  -0.13 
   [-3.95]  [-3.61]   [-3.67]  
r1,0   -4.59 -4.64  -4.66 
   [-14.51]  [-14.78]   [-14.79]  
r12,2   0.16 0.13  0.13 
   [1.35] [1.10]  [1.14] 
    
Panel C: Fama-MacBeth regressions using DOLSGA    
DOL 0.72  0.66  1.42 -0.50 
 [4.07]  [4.20]  [2.89] [-1.36]  
GP  0.33  0.54 -0.72 1.12 
  [2.58]  [4.35] [-1.75]  [3.34] 
lnB/M   0.40 0.40  0.45 
   [6.22] [6.04]  [6.54] 
lnME   -0.11 -0.12  -0.13 
   [-3.34]  [-3.61]   [-3.77]  
r1,0   -4.77 -4.64  -4.80 
   [-14.47]  [-14.78]   [-14.53]  
r12,2   0.10 0.13  0.09 
   [0.87] [1.10]  [0.79] 
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In Panel B I report the results of equal regressions, but using EBITDA-based DOL instead. The 
results are similar to those of Panel A, however, DOLEBITDA seemingly being better able to 
capture risk premium than DOLEBIT, as in individual regressions (specification 1) DOLEBITDA 
has twice the coefficient (0.013) than DOLEBIT (0.006), simultaneously the result being 
considerably more significant, being almost statistically significant at 5 percent confidence 
level (t-statistic of 1.90). This result, in spite of not being statistically significant, indicates 
lightly that inclusion of depreciation and amortization (D&A) weakens the capability of 
DOLEBIT to capture risk, and thus predict returns, as the amount of D&A is directly linked to 
firm’s capital investment level, which on the other hand, is related to lower risk and lower 
expected returns (e.g., Berk et al., 1999). Similarly to Panel A, when adding other control 
variables than GP, DOLEBITDA loses much of its power to predict returns.  
 
Contrary to the results regarding DOLEBIT and DOLEBITDA, which are elasticity measures, the 
DOL based on SGA expenses (a point-to-point measure) seems to capture the risk premium 
considerably better than those elasticity measures of DOL, individually and with other control 
variables (excluding GP) producing positive coefficients (0.72 in specification 1 and 0.66 in 
specification 3) that are statistically highly significant (t-statistics of 4.07 and 4.20, 
respectively) both being statistically significant at 0.1 percent confidence level. Moreover, it is 
important for one to note that the individual risk premium, and the risk premium when 
controlling for other variables is higher for DOLSGA than for GP, which would obviously be 
natural if DOL was the real risk factor behind the gross profitability premium. 
 
Thirdly, when employing DOL and GP simultaneously in Fama-MacBeth regression 
specifications (5) and (6), the results are very different for elasticity measures of DOL than for 
SGA-based DOL. Specification (5) of Panel A and Panel B shows that elasticity measure of 
DOL and GP are capturing very different risk. The coefficients for DOLEBIT and DOLEBITDA 
are considerably higher than in any other specification, while the statistical significance being 
higher as well – actually the coefficient of DOLEBITDA is significant at 5 percent confidence 
level in specification (5). But, when other controls are added in specification (6) the coefficients 
for both drop negative while the statistical significance falling. Again, the results are somewhat 
opposite to DOLSGA in Panel C, as DOLSGA and GP seem to capture much of the same risk, GP 
even being statistically insignificant in specification (5) and DOLSGA being significant at 1 
percent confidence level. When adding the other control variables in specification (6) the 
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statistical significance of DOLSGA falls to insignificant, signaling that the risk DOLSGA 
represents can already be captured by other controls, namely GP and B/M. 
 
To further examine the interrelation between gross profitability, risk, and expected returns and 
between different measures of DOL, risk, and expected returns, I conduct a four-factor 
portfolio analysis by following Fama and French (1993), but augmenting their three-factor 
model with a factor capturing the effect of momentum similar to Carhart (1997), and sorting 
the stocks first into quintile portfolios on gross profitability (Table 4 displays the gross 
profitability portfolio characteristics). From here on, to such a model, I will refer as a Carhart 
four-factor model. Next, I run four-factor regressions on each of the portfolios while 
controlling for the effect of size, value, and momentum, and finally presenting the value-
weighted excess returns, alphas, and factor loadings for each portfolio. Table 5 presents the 
results of this particular analysis, and it is immediately visible that excess returns increase 
almost monotonically, while the alpha increases monotonically and high-minus-low strategy 
on gross profitability generating a monthly abnormal returns of 0.60 percent (t-statistic of 3.13). 
These results of highly gross profitable firms earning higher returns than firms with low gross 
profitability resemble the results on gross profitability obtained by Novy-Marx (2013). The 
results of Table 5 signal that gross profitability is associated with risk that cannot be captured 
by the value factor, the size factor, or the momentum factor of the Carhart four-factor model, 
hence supporting the findings of preceding Fama-MacBeth regression analysis. Furthermore, 
the loadings on the value factor HML decrease in gross profitability, indicating that the value 
premium and the gross profitability premium are negatively correlated as Novy-Marx (2013) 
finds. The results are insensitive to excluding the momentum factor (UMD), and effectively 
employing a Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993). 
 
I also employ the previous analysis on different definitions of DOL, consequently sorting the 
stocks into quintile portfolios on each measure of DOL. In Table 6, I present the results of this 
analysis. Panel A, using DOLEBIT as a sorting variable, provides empirical results that support 
the findings obtained from the previous Fama-MacBeth regression analysis. Importantly, the 
results tell that the portfolio including the stocks with highest DOLEBIT has not historically 
provided any additional returns for investors than the stocks with the lowest DOLEBIT, and the 
high-minus-low strategy has even generated negative abnormal returns of 0.18 percent per 
month (t-statistic of -1.00) after controlling for other risk factors. Altogether it seems that there 
is no additional risk emanating from DOLEBIT that could not already be captured by the 
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controls, which nonetheless does not contradict with the previous literature arguing that the 
value premium and DOL (especially an elasticity measure) are positively related to each other.  
 
Table 4: Gross profitability portfolio summary statistics 
Table presents time-series average characteristics of portfolios sorted on gross profitability (GP), defined as sales minus cost 
of goods sold (COGS), and scaled by total book assets (AT). Portfolios are constructed by using NYSE breakpoints and 
rebalanced at the end of each June. Tables 2 and D1 describe the construction of DOL estimates in more detail. Summary 
statistics are for the time period 1967– 2014. Financials and utilities are excluded from the sample. The data sample consists 
of 4,407 firms and 724,324 monthly observations.  
 
  Gross profitability portfolio 
  Low 2 3 4 High 
GP 0.13 0.27 0.36 0.48 0.76 
Book-to-market 1.09 0.94 0.86 0.78 0.69 
Average capitalization ($106) 2,587 3,571 2,674 3,312 2,761 
DOLEBITDA 2.80 2.36 2.39 2.39 2.71 
DOLEBIT 4.42 3.70 3.52 3.41 3.75 
DOLSGA 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.31 0.57 
DOLTC 0.80 1.05 1.17 1.28 1.76 
DOLBook 0.40 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.25 
Number of firms 237 226 247 279 309 
 
Table 5: Excess returns to portfolios sorted on gross profitability 
Table presents the monthly value-weighted average excess returns to portfolios sorted on gross profitability, which is defined 
as sales minus cost of goods sold scaled by total book assets. The table shows also the monthly value-weighted average 
abnormal returns and returns for the market factor (MKT), the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), and the momentum 
factor (UMD) from portfolio-wise time-series regressions by following Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The t-
statistics are presented in square brackets. Portfolios are constructed by using NYSE breakpoints and rebalanced at the end of 
each June. The data sample extends from 1967 to 2014, and excludes financials and utilities. 
 
    Alphas and four-factor loadings 
Portfolio re α MKT SMB HML UMD 
Portfolios sorted on gross profitability   
Low 0.53 -0.09 1.04 0.01 0.30 0.06 
 [2.44] [-0.79]  [23.02] [0.19] [4.01] [0.81] 
2 0.60 0.07 1.07 -0.08 0.24 -0.02 
 [2.95] [0.52] [25.99] [-1.41]  [2.90] [-0.22]  
3 0.64 0.25 1.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
 [2.91] [2.40] [32.08] [-0.09]  [-0.15]  [-0.38]  
4 0.63 0.36 1.00 -0.11 -0.32 -0.13 
 [2.94] [2.91] [21.64] [-2.41]  [-5.14]  [-2.63]  
High 0.64 0.51 0.79 -0.15 -0.51 -0.04 
 [2.98] [3.73] [15.94] [-2.46]  [-7.10]  [-0.81]  
High-Low 0.11 0.60 -0.25 -0.16 -0.81 -0.11 
 [0.58] [3.13] [-3.35]  [-1.81]  [-8.15]  [-1.13]  
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Table 6: Excess returns to portfolios sorted on degree of operating leverage 
Table presents the monthly value-weighted average excess returns to portfolios sorted on degree of operating leverage (DOL) 
estimates. The table shows also the monthly value-weighted average abnormal returns and returns to the market factor (MKT), 
the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), and the momentum factor (UMD) from portfolio-wise time-series regressions 
by following Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The t-statistics are presented in square brackets. Portfolios are 
constructed by using NYSE breakpoints and rebalanced at the end of each June. The data sample extends from 1967 to 2014, 
and excludes financials and utilities. Tables 2 and D1 describe the construction of DOL estimates in more detail. 
 
    Alphas and four-factor loadings 
Portfolio re α MKT SMB HML UMD 
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on DOLEBIT    
Low 0.59 0.36 0.88 -0.16 -0.23 -0.07 
 [2.88] [2.74] [19.64] [-3.53]  [-3.31]  [-1.26]  
2 0.64 0.23 1.00 -0.16 -0.11 0.03 
 [3.12] [1.82] [20.17] [-4.39]  [-1.56]  [0.59] 
3 0.59 0.20 0.95 -0.07 -0.04 -0.01 
 [2.96] [2.00] [24.73] [-1.48]  [-0.59]  [-0.09]  
4 0.67 0.30 1.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 
 [3.16] [2.73] [24.49] [-0.88]  [-1.12]  [-0.79]  
High 0.60 0.19 1.15 0.09 0.07 -0.19 
 [2.75] [1.41] [33.31] [1.53] [0.77] [-2.56]  
High-Low 0.02 -0.18 0.28 0.26 0.30 -0.13 
 [0.14] [-1.00]  [4.61] [3.21] [2.79] [-1.44]  
       
Panel B: Portfolios sorted on DOLEBITDA    
Low 0.64 0.33 0.89 -0.11 -0.18 -0.03 
 [3.00] [2.26] [21.46] [-2.26]  [-2.84]  [-0.58]  
2 0.56 0.25 1.00 -0.21 -0.11 -0.01 
 [2.78] [2.31] [25.07] [-5.07]  [-1.61]  [-0.20]  
3 0.63 0.33 0.95 -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 
 [3.06] [2.71] [23.75] [-1.19]  [-1.28]  [-0.27]  
4 0.60 0.11 1.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.12 
 [2.88] [0.95] [31.54] [-0.22]  [-0.77]  [-2.32]  
High 0.72 0.24 1.07 0.12 -0.02 -0.10 
 [3.33] [2.31] [26.93] [2.04] [-0.19]  [-1.31]  
High-Low 0.08 -0.08 0.17 0.24 0.17 -0.07 
 [0.54] [-0.51]  [2.90] [3.06] [1.47] [-0.70]  
       
Panel C: Portfolios sorted on DOLSGA   
Low 0.43 -0.09 1.13 -0.09 0.37 0.00 
 [1.81] [-0.55]  [24.98] [-1.25]  [2.98] [-0.01]  
2 0.68 0.20 1.09 -0.12 0.13 -0.10 
 [3.33] [1.84] [26.36] [-2.21]  [1.93] [-1.37]  
3 0.67 0.23 1.00 0.02 -0.27 -0.01 
 [2.90] [1.81] [31.04] [0.44] [-4.42]  [-0.28]  
4 0.57 0.41 0.90 -0.06 -0.40 -0.19 
 [2.63] [2.98] [14.88] [-1.01]  [-5.41]  [-3.58]  
High 0.76 0.51 0.83 -0.15 -0.45 0.04 
 [3.59] [3.48] [22.28] [-2.88]  [-5.38]  [0.50] 
High-Low 0.33 0.60 -0.30 -0.07 -0.81 0.04 
 [1.37] [2.54] [-4.58]  [-0.72]  [-5.47]  [0.28] 
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Panel B of Table 6 provides the results regarding the sort on EBITDA-based DOL. The results 
are very similar those of Panel A, high-minus-low strategy, however, producing slightly higher 
excess returns than the sort on EBIT-based DOL (0.08 percent vs. 0.02 percent), and less 
negative monthly alpha (-0.08 percent vs. -0.18 percent), the results though being statistically 
insignificant again. All in all, the results of the Carhart four-factor regression analysis regarding 
DOL values approximated by using an elasticity measure approach are in line with those 
obtained in the Fama-MacBeth regression analysis, indicating the low capability of explaining 
risk and expected returns after adding the control variables.  
 
As with Fama-MacBeth regressions the results regarding the deployment of SGA/AT as a 
proxy for DOL generates considerably different results to those of using an elasticity 
measurement approach. Panel C of Table 6 gives results showing that there is significant 
abnormal returns of 0.60 percent (t-statistic of 2.54) per month to be made with levered-minus-
unlevered strategy, which cannot be captured by the four-factor model. However, the excess 
returns are not monotonically increasing with DOLSGA, but this might be due the fact that SGA 
costs cannot capture all the fixed costs firms have, thus somewhat biasing the results. Other 
possible reason might be varying accounting practices across industries, hence biasing the 
cross-sectional results. Moreover, in alignment with the previous results, there seems to be 
more risk and expected returns associated with DOLSGA than with gross profitability. 
 
5.2.1. Discussion 
Concluding from the empirical results obtained in this section, the higher gross profitability 
seems to be associated with higher expected returns, highly gross profitable firms earning 
higher excess returns and significantly higher abnormal returns than those with lower gross 
profitability. These results are consistent with the findings of Novy-Marx (2013), and 
consequently I can provide further empirical support for the existence of the gross profitability 
premium. 
 
Furthermore, I am able to provide some insight on how degree of operating leverage is linked 
to systematic risk and expected returns. García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010), for instance, 
provides evidence that an elasticity measure of DOL (using EBIT-based value) is the risk factor 
affecting the level of the B/M ratio. Contrary to García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010), I was not 
able to provide statistically significant results on the association between EBIT-based DOL 
43 
 
and expected returns, nonetheless, my data sample being considerably larger than that 
employed by them and excluding utilities, thus the results likely being reliable. However, if I 
use a data sample covering the years 1986-2003 similarly to García-Feijóo and Jorgensen 
(2010), I obtain economically somewhat similar results regarding the Fama-MacBeth risk 
premia on DOLEBIT as they do, and with similar statistical significance. Importantly, when 
testing DOLEBITDA with years 1986-2003, it performs considerably better in economical and 
statistical terms than DOLEBIT in capturing risk (see Table C1 for further details), which is 
again in agreement with my other results.    
 
Economically these results regarding the association between elasticity measure of DOL and 
expected returns, nonetheless, are similar to the results of García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010) 
suggesting that individually DOLEBIT (and DOLEBITDA) may be a risk factor, but losing its 
power completely when adding the value as a control. The indicative results are in line with 
Carlson et al. (2004) as they predict the risk to increase when a firm operates closer to its break-
even point, the firm effectively having higher book-to-market ratio and higher operating 
leverage, which is linearly related to B/M in their model. And, as the elasticity measures of 
DOL assign high DOL values for those firms operating in the proximity of their break-even 
points, along Carlson et al. (2004), it is likely that B/M ratio already captures this risk 
emanating from low profit margins. So, my results of this section are consistent with the 
previous literature (Carlson et al., 2004; García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010) stating that 
elasticity measures of DOL are closely related to the value premium. These results are 
consistent with my theory that the closeness of the break-even point, causes the risk premium 
that can be captured by an elasticity measure of DOL. Moreover, the results indicate that GP 
and elasticity measures of DOL are not positively connected to each other, which is consistent 
with my theory and ex ante predictions. 
 
Contrary to the elasticity measures of DOL, DOLSGA seems to capture a different risk, as the 
Fama-MacBeth regressions show economically and statistically significant risk premium for 
DOLSGA even after controlling for value, size, and momentum. These results appear to be 
somewhat equivalent to gross profitability. These empirical findings are further supported in 
four-factor analysis, in which GP sort and DOLSGA sort seems to provide similar excess and 
abnormal returns for a high-minus-low strategy, thus giving some preliminary insights of the 
interrelation between these two.  
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These results, in consonance with the existence of gross profitability premium, cast a serious 
doubt on the traditional elasticity-based definition of DOL, as fundamentally any firm whose 
earnings are highly sensitive to changes in sales due to high fixed costs, regardless of the 
current level of sales, should be riskier than similar firms with less fixed costs. As elasticity 
measurement approach is highly dependent on the reference point from which the sales and the 
earnings change, it obviously assigns the highest DOLEBITDA and DOLEBIT values for those 
firms having the initial earnings close to zero (which is the case at the break-even point), and 
the opposite values for those firms whose reference earnings are already at a high level 
regardless of the actual amount of fixed costs. And, as the example in Table 1 showed, the 
elasticity measurement approach may even assign same DOL estimates for firms that in 
absolute terms have considerably different earnings sensitivities, just because the proportional 
changes in sales and earnings are equivalent. According to the results, a more direct proxy for 
fixed costs to represent the operating leverage, here SGA-to-total book assets, seems to capture 
the risk intuitively associated with fixed costs better than an indirect proxy.  
 
Drawing from the results of this chapter, I will continue to compare an elasticity-based DOL 
to a point-to-point measure of DOL when examining the association between DOL and the 
gross profitability premium, but excluding DOLEBIT from the further tests, as it cannot provide 
any additional information above DOLEBITDA. The inferior performance of DOLEBIT was 
predicted ex ante due to its tendency to implicitly include the effect of capital investments. 
 
5.3. DOL and the gross profitability premium 
In this section I present the test results on the association between DOL and the gross 
profitability premium, and how the results are sensitive to the definition of operating leverage. 
Table 7 exhibits 25 portfolios sorted by using NYSE breakpoints on size and gross profitability. 
The average monthly returns and average DOL estimates by using different estimation methods 
are presented for each portfolio. DOL values are based on EBITDA and SGA, additionally I 
present the book DOL values for each portfolio by following García-Feijóo and Jorgensen 
(2010) who define book DOL as the five-year-average of the ratio of fixed assets-to-total book 
assets. Firstly, one can see from Table 7 that returns generally increase with gross profitability, 
each high-minus-low strategy on gross profitability generating positive, though statistically 
insignificant, returns across all the size sorts. 
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Table 7: Quintile portfolio sorts on gross profitability and size 
Table presents average monthly returns and operating leverage estimates for 25 portfolios created by sorting stocks on size (at 
the end of June of year t) and then on gross profitability, which is defined as sales minus cost of goods sold scaled by total 
book assets (at the end of December of year t-1). Portfolios are constructed by using NYSE breakpoints and rebalanced at the 
end of each June. Degree of operating leverage (DOL) estimates include EBITDA-based DOL, SGA-based DOL, and book 
DOL. Tables 2 and D1 describe the construction of DOL estimates in more detail. The data sample extends from 1967 to 2014, 
and excludes financials and utilities. 
 
Gross profitability Size quintile quintile 
 Small 2 3 4 Big All 
             
Panel A: Average monthly returns (%)     
Low 1.77 1.28 1.31 1.22 0.90 1.42 
2 1.62 1.46 1.15 1.19 0.98 1.41 
3 1.77 1.26 1.23 1.14 1.05 1.43 
4 1.82 1.37 1.25 1.12 1.05 1.48 
High 2.00 1.50 1.55 1.32 1.14 1.70 
All 1.80 1.37 1.31 1.20 1.03  
High-Low 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.10 0.24 0.29 
 [1.50] [1.33] [1.53] [0.52] [1.28] [1.94] 
       
Panel B: Average DOLEBITDA      
Low 2.87 3.08 2.83 2.62 2.04 2.77 
2 2.77 2.43 2.20 1.90 1.61 2.40 
3 2.81 2.67 2.06 1.79 1.71 2.44 
4 2.83 2.23 1.99 1.80 1.64 2.37 
High 3.38 2.55 2.16 1.71 1.37 2.70 
All 2.97 2.57 2.25 1.96 1.67  
High-Low 0.51 -0.53 -0.67 -0.92 -0.67 -0.07 
 [4.86] [-4.25]  [-5.43]  [-5.63]  [-4.98]  [-1.06]  
       
Panel C: Average DOLSGA      
Low 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 
2 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.15 
3 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.22 
4 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.31 
High 0.61 0.55 0.54 0.49 0.47 0.56 
All 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.24  
High-Low 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.40 0.47 
 [70.34] [64.75] [41.63] [45.09] [47.85] [92.52] 
       
Panel D: Average DOLBook      
Low 0.35 0.41 0.45 0.46 0.42 0.40 
2 0.31 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.44 0.36 
3 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.30 
4 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.32 0.27 
High 0.22 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.25 
All 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.37  
High-Low -0.13 -0.16 -0.16 -0.17 -0.12 -0.15 
 [-24.09]  [-20.13]  [-14.80]  [-19.98]  [-12.59]  [-32.75]  
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Panel B provides EBITDA-based DOL values for each portfolio, and one can see that those 
DOL values strongly decrease when gross profitability increases within each size quintile 
excluding the smallest stocks, hence the result being an exact opposite for the original 
prediction of DOL causing the gross profitability premium. However, this result just underlines 
the theory that it is not possible to capture the risk that causes the gross profitability premium 
with an elasticity-based DOL. The results in Panel D with book DOL are very similar to those 
obtained by using DOLEBITDA, which is consistent with the findings of the previous literature 
(see e.g., García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010). But fixed costs affecting the break-even point 
of a firm and affecting its earnings’ sensitivity, include plenty of costs that do not have 
representation in fixed assets, such as administration related costs. SGA-based proxy for DOL, 
on the other hand, also considers these fixed costs that are not tied to fixed assets, and which 
are likely to become even more important as more and more of the firms operate nowadays 
without considerable fixed manufacturing assets, but merely with only intellectual assets 
characteristic to the era of information technology. For that reason, it is not a surprise to see in 
Table 7 DOLSGA values increasing perfectly monotonically within each size sort, while the 
difference between the extreme GP quintiles being highly significant statistically, the p-values 
effectively being 0.00.   
 
By following the methodology of García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010), I report in Table 8 the 
results regarding the annual cross-sectional regressions of DOL on GP, thus providing direct 
evidence that DOL (SGA-based) is directly linked to gross profitability, and DOLEBITDA, based 
on an elasticity measure, is rather not. Table 8 shows the time-series average of coefficient 
estimates and corresponding t-statistics. 
 
When regressing DOLEBITDA against GP, the coefficient of GP does not attain economically 
nor statistically significant values. Interestingly, when controlling for B/M, the economical and 
statistical significance of GP’s coefficient increases dramatically. This might signal that after 
adding the control for value, effectively the control for the proximity of break-even point 
(Carlson et al., 2004), further increases in gross profitability are linked to higher sensitivity of 
earnings to sales. This is in consonance with the fundamental intuition on how operating 
leverage levers the operations and increases the operational risk, which is that the risk increases 
either through the cost trade-off channel or increased fixed costs (which may or may not 
increase the break-even point as well). And, the cost trade-off channel of risk affects the gross 
profitability and the sensitivity of earnings to sales, which here seems to be captured by 
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DOLEBITDA after controlling for the risk from low margins. Controlling for size does not affect 
the results. 
 
Table 8: Firm level regressions of operating leverage measures on gross profitability 
Table presents the annual cross-sectional regression results of operating leverage measures (the degree of operating leverage 
measures are based on 1) EBITDA and 2) SGA expenses) on gross profitability (GP). Book-to-market (B/M) and size (ME) 
are used as controls. The t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation by following Loughran and Schultz (2005). The data 
sample extends from 1967 to 2014, and excludes financials and utilities. 
 
  Average parameter values and [t-statistics] 
Dependent variable Intercept lnGP lnME lnB/M 
     
lnDOLEBITDA 0.30 0.07   
 [5.76] [0.36]   
 0.65 0.03 -0.06  
 [4.70] [0.19] [-4.53]   
 0.32 0.32  0.25 
 [4.05] [2.15]  [12.27] 
 0.49 0.26 -0.03 0.22 
 [2.42] [2.28] [-1.19]  [4.87] 
     
lnDOLSGA -3.04 4.35   
 [-92.88]  [74.03]   
 -2.61 4.30 -0.08  
 [-22.99]  [67.43] [-12.37]   
 -3.05 4.50  0.13 
 [-67.52]  [65.45]  [6.34] 
 -2.63 4.33 -0.07 0.03 
 [-18.81]  [50.88] [-9.12]  [1.19] 
          
 
When switching from DOLEBITDA to DOLSGA, the results change completely, being both 
economically and statistically highly significant for each of the specifications. To provide an 
example to stress the link between DOLSGA and GP, think of increasing GP from the median 
value of 0.38 to the 75th percentile value with GP of 0.54, with the regression coefficient of GP 
being 4.35, the increase in DOLSGA would be 183 percent. These results as well are robust for 
adding size as control, but consistent with the previous results of this paper and contrary to 
regressions of DOLEBITDA on GP, controlling for B/M does not have an impact on these results.   
 
In Table 9 I report results from a four-factor regression analysis, which is augmented by DOL 
factor. I conduct the analysis by following the example of Kisser (2014), first by sorting the 
stocks into quintile portfolios on gross profitability by using NYSE breakpoints. The additional 
factor for DOL is constructed in a similar manner to other controls (Fama and French, 1993; 
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Carhart, 1997) for both DOL based on EBITDA and DOL based on SGA. The second column 
reports the value-weighted excess returns to each portfolio, while the third portfolio reports the 
abnormal returns the employed five-factor model cannot capture. The rest of the columns 
exhibit the factor loadings for each of the risk factor trying to explain the returns.  
 
Table 9: Excess returns to portfolios sorted on gross profitability (a five-factor model) 
Table presents the monthly value-weighted average excess returns to portfolios sorted on gross profitability into quintile 
portfolios. The table shows also the monthly value-weighted average abnormal returns and returns to the market factor (MKT), 
the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), the momentum factor (UMD), and the operating leverage factor (DOL) from 
portfolio-wise time-series regressions by following Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), and Kisser (2014). The 
construction of DOL is equivalent to other factors (see Methodology), and it is constructed for both EBITDA-based DOL and 
SGA-based DOL. The t-statistics are presented in square brackets. Portfolios are constructed by using NYSE breakpoints and 
rebalanced at the end of each June. The data sample extends from 1967 to 2014, and excludes financials and utilities. 
 
    Alphas and five-factor loadings 
Portfolio re α MKT SMB HML UMD DOL 
        
Panel A: DOL factor based on EBITDA      
Low 0.53 -0.09 1.00 -0.02 0.28 -0.03 0.23 
 [2.44] [-0.78]  [22.53] [-0.27]  [3.24] [-0.40]  [1.59] 
2 0.60 0.08 1.02 -0.06 0.20 -0.11 0.13 
 [2.95] [0.55] [21.62] [-0.93]  [2.22] [-1.01]  [1.07] 
3 0.64 0.33 1.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 0.35 
 [2.91] [2.93] [32.45] [-0.74]  [-0.22]  [-0.89]  [3.70] 
4 0.63 0.33 0.95 -0.09 -0.38 -0.17 0.06 
 [2.94] [2.82] [25.72] [-1.73]  [-6.48]  [-2.68]  [0.80] 
High 0.64 0.48 0.90 -0.12 -0.45 0.06 -0.33 
 [2.98] [4.03] [20.20] [-2.04]  [-6.13]  [0.68] [-2.96]  
High-Low 0.11 0.57 -0.10 -0.10 -0.72 0.09 -0.57 
 [0.58] [3.14] [-1.27]  [-1.12]  [-6.00]  [0.62] [-2.64]  
        
Panel B: DOL factor based on SGA      
Low 0.53 0.15 0.93 0.02 -0.08 0.09 -0.48 
 [2.44] [1.55] [23.77] [0.41] [-0.89]  [0.75] [-8.34]  
2 0.60 0.35 0.95 -0.08 -0.16 0.03 -0.67 
 [2.95] [3.80] [23.50] [-1.99]  [-2.77]  [0.80] [-14.78]  
3 0.64 0.44 1.03 -0.04 -0.19 -0.04 -0.31 
 [2.91] [3.99] [37.61] [-1.13]  [-3.40]  [-0.63]  [-7.18]  
4 0.63 0.29 1.01 -0.07 -0.27 -0.05 0.12 
 [2.94] [1.79] [16.97] [-1.14]  [-3.62]  [-0.91]  [1.49] 
High 0.64 0.32 0.92 -0.13 -0.25 -0.01 0.43 
 [2.98] [2.63] [18.03] [-3.14]  [-2.91]  [-0.16]  [7.60] 
High-Low 0.11 0.17 0.00 -0.15 -0.17 -0.11 0.91 
 [0.58] [1.31] [-0.05]  [-2.64]  [-1.44]  [-0.60]  [12.42] 
                
 
In Panel A the DOL factor is constructed by using DOLEBITDA, and in Panel B by using 
DOLSGA. First, it is noteworthy that while the excess returns almost monotonically rise in gross 
49 
 
profitability, the abnormal returns in Panel A increase monotonically, and the high-minus-low 
strategy on gross profitability generates 57 basis points of abnormal returns on a monthly basis, 
meaning that the five-factor model is not very good at capturing the risk and returns that co-
exist with gross profitability. Second, and more importantly, the abnormal returns do not 
increase with GP when using DOLSGA to construct the DOL variable for the model, and the 
difference between the extreme quintiles being statistically indistinguishable from zero. This 
result indicates that the five-factor model with the additional SGA-based DOL can price the 
risk involved in gross profitability. Furthermore, the t-statistic of high-minus-low strategy for 
DOL factor being the highest (12.42) among the risk factors, which demonstrates significance 
of the link between the amount of fixed costs and the gross profitability premium. However, 
similar to Kisser (2014) some of the quintile portfolios in Panel B continue to generate 
significant abnormal returns even after controlling for DOL. Kisser (2014) mentioned in his 
paper that this might be due to differing asset risks that cannot be captured by the pricing model, 
nevertheless, not elaborating those risks in any more detail. However, finding out the reason 
for such abnormal returns is not in the scope of this study.  
 
Figure 2: Historical cumulative returns on high-minus-low strategies 
Figure displays the historical cumulative returns on high-minus-low strategies based on gross profitability, DOLSGA, and 
DOLEBITDA with the initial investment of $1 between July 1967 and December 2014. The returns are value-weighted monthly 
returns, and the high portfolio includes the top quintile of stocks regarding the variable of interest, whereas the low portfolio 
includes the bottom quintile of stocks regarding the same variable. The portfolios are rebalanced at the end of each June. The 
axis for the high-minus-low strategy based on DOLSGA is on the right hand side of the figure.  
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Figure 2 nicely illustrates the results of this section regarding the association between the gross 
profitability premium and different measures of DOL. Whereas the returns on high-minus-low 
strategy based on gross profitability and DOLSGA have historically moved together while 
generating positive cumulative returns, the returns on high-minus-low strategy based on 
DOLEBITDA have been somewhat flat, and the cumulative returns even being negative. Figure 
2 underlines the association between the gross profitability premium and DOL, when using 
DOLSGA as a proxy, but also shows that its association with an elasticity measure of DOL, 
when using DOLEBITDA as a proxy, is non-existent. It is also noteworthy, that the cumulative 
returns on high-minus-low strategy based on DOLSGA are considerably higher than the 
cumulative returns on the equal strategy employing gross profitability. This observation is in 
line with the idea of DOL being the real risk factor behind the gross profitability premium – 
not the gross profitability per se – for which investors require compensation.  
 
5.3.1. Discussion 
The results I present in this section unanimously suggest the positive link between DOL and 
the gross profitability premium and support the hypothesis that DOL is the true risk factor 
largely determining the gross profitability premium. However, these results are highly method 
sensitive whether a point-to-point measure with SGA expenses or an elasticity measure 
measuring the sensitivity of EBITDA to sales is used. The aforementioned results apply only 
to SGA-based DOL measure, the result being consistent with the findings of Kisser (2014), 
whilst the link between EBITDA-based DOL and GP seems weak or even negative, as 
interestingly EBITDA-based DOL increases when gross profitability decreases. In other 
words, the lowest GP quintile of stocks seems to be associated with the highest DOLEBITDA 
values. And as gross profitability is defined as sales minus costs of goods sold (i.e., variable 
costs), the firms in the lowest gross profitability quintile should consequently have the highest 
variable costs relative to sales. Therefore, it seems that an elasticity measure of DOL is not 
purely related the actual scale of fixed costs, as the theory of an elasticity measurement 
approach claims, but merely related to the proximity of the break-even point. Therefore, it is 
not difficult to see that the value premium, which is related to margins, and thus to break-even 
point according to Carlson et al. (2004), is positively linked to DOL measured by using an 
elasticity measurement approach.  
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As a result, the empirical findings support the hypothesis that the elasticity measures of DOL 
cannot very well capture the risk fundamentally associated with high operating leverage. It 
seems that the elasticity measures of DOL only captures the relative sensitivity of earnings to 
sales without distinguishing where the sensitivity of earnings is originated from (high unit 
variable cost or fixed costs). Whereas, a non-elasticity measure of DOL, such as SGA-to-AT, 
describes more directly the actual level of fixed costs, without considering the biasing effect of 
unit variable cost. If firm A has a high DOLSGA, the information already gives indication that 
firm A has high fixed costs relative to its operating metrics (such as variable costs and total 
costs) in a given industry, whereas a firm B with a low DOLSGA, is more likely to actually have 
lower fixed costs relative to its operating metrics. For that reason, it is likely that firm B is able 
to better adjust its operations than firm A if sales contract, as a result carrying less risk. 
Therefore, I can conclude that DOLSGA more directly describes the magnitude of risk 
emanating from operating leverage through cost trade-off (highly linked to gross profitability), 
relatively high level of fixed costs, and higher break-even point because of high fixed costs, 
hence describing the fundamental risks that high fixed costs cause. If firm A, on the other hand, 
has higher DOLEBITDA than firm B, one could only say that firm A has earnings to be relatively 
more sensitive to sales than firm B, without giving any hint on the true level of fixed costs, and 
thus on operating leverage. Furthermore, the existence of the gross profitability premium and 
its positive linkage with DOLSGA, suggests that investors do care about the relative level of 
fixed costs and the risks linked to it, and less interested whether the earnings are only relatively 
sensitive to sales.  
 
Interestingly, if a firm only increased its fixed costs (without affecting the level of its unit 
variable cost), hence increasing its break-even point, its operating profits would decrease. If 
the sales stayed on a current level, the risk from decreased margins would be reflected in lower 
market value of equity, effectively increasing the B/M ratio. Virtually, the increased risk, in 
this case, would be captured by the value premium. But if sales increased well above the new 
break-even point, the operating profits surging, the market value of equity would increase so 
that the value factor could not anymore capture the risk associated with the firm’s high fixed 
costs. And, as there was no cost trade-off between variable and fixed costs, the gross 
profitability did not change. This logic gives an interesting prediction that operating 
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profitability 3  captures generally the risk related to high fixed costs, whereas the gross 
profitability premium captures the risk regarding the cost trade-off between variable and fixed 
operating costs. However, examination of this prediction is not in the scope of this paper. 
 
5.4. DOL and the value premium 
In this section I primarily provide insight on the relationship between DOL and the value 
premium, but understanding this relationship helps also to see the link between DOL and the 
gross profitability premium and between the gross profitability premium and the value 
premium. Currently the literature seems to be missing a clear view on the relationships of this 
triangle as traditionally DOL has been associated with the value premium (see e.g., Carlson et 
al., 2004; Zhang, 2005; García-Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010; Novy-Marx, 2011), whereas Kisser 
(2014) proposes that there is a negative relationship between DOL and the value premium. 
Also, García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010) find similarly to Gulen et al. (2011) that by 
employing a different methodology to measure the relationship between DOL and the value 
premium, this particular relationship would be negative. However, the previous literature, 
including Kisser (2014) has not been able to explain why such differences exist.  
 
In Table 10 I report the average returns and average DOL estimates for different measures of 
DOL, namely DOLEBITDA, DOLSGA, and DOLBook for 25 portfolios first sorted on gross 
profitability and then on B/M. First, I aim to show that the risk increasing effect of a high DOL 
is actually visible in equity values, hence higher risk decreasing the equity values, and 
consequently increasing B/M ratios. This has been the dominant view of the previous literature, 
and in Table 10 I show that when controlling for gross profitability, each measure of DOL 
(excluding the DOLBook) increases in book-to-market ratio, and the differences between the 
extreme B/M quintiles being generally statistically highly significant. As a result, there appears 
to be a positive link between DOL and B/M when gross profitability is controlled.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Ball et al. (2015) finds that firms with high operating profitability (defined as gross profit minus sales, general, 
and administrative expenses excluding research and development costs, and scaled by total book assets) earn 
higher excess returns compared to firms with low operating profitability.  
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Table 10: Quintile portfolio sorts on gross profitability and value 
Table presents average monthly returns and operating leverage estimates for 25 portfolios created by sorting stocks first on 
gross profitability, which is defined as sales minus cost of goods sold scaled by total book assets (at the end of December of 
year t-1) and then on book-to-market (at the end of December of year t-1). Portfolios are constructed by using NYSE 
breakpoints and rebalanced at the end of each June. Degree of operating leverage (DOL) estimates include EBITDA-based 
DOL, SGA-based DOL, and book DOL. Tables 2 and D1 describe the construction of DOL estimates in more detail. The data 
sample extends from 1967 to 2014, and excludes financials and utilities. 
 
B/M Gross profitability quintile quintile 
  Low 2 3 4 High All 
       
Panel A: Average monthly returns (%)    
Low 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.98 1.20 1.00 
2 1.24 1.17 1.25 1.24 1.39 1.26 
3 1.42 1.24 1.43 1.29 1.58 1.39 
4 1.53 1.49 1.51 1.63 1.73 1.59 
High 1.92 1.86 1.95 1.98 2.13 1.99 
All 1.42 1.37 1.47 1.50 1.68  
High-Low 0.98 0.91 1.01 1.01 0.94 0.98 
 [4.71] [4.85] [6.36] [4.72] [4.78] [6.14] 
       
Panel B: Average DOLEBITDA     
Low 2.37 2.11 2.06 1.84 1.85 2.06 
2 2.50 2.09 1.98 1.96 2.06 2.13 
3 2.85 2.28 2.24 2.06 2.28 2.33 
4 2.99 2.21 2.24 2.40 2.59 2.50 
High 3.26 2.83 2.97 3.11 3.86 3.26 
All 2.80 2.36 2.39 2.39 2.71  
High-Low 0.89 0.72 0.90 1.27 2.01 1.20 
 [7.29] [5.48] [7.77] [9.62] [14.97] [14.33] 
       
Panel C: Average DOLSGA     
Low 0.11 0.14 0.20 0.28 0.51 0.26 
2 0.08 0.13 0.20 0.28 0.53 0.27 
3 0.08 0.14 0.21 0.30 0.54 0.28 
4 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.32 0.57 0.30 
High 0.10 0.17 0.25 0.36 0.63 0.33 
All 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.31 0.57  
High-Low -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.07 
 [-3.18]  [8.75] [14.26] [27.36] [14.22] [20.52] 
       
Panel D: Average DOLBook     
Low 0.36 0.35 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.31 
2 0.41 0.38 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.32 
3 0.42 0.38 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.32 
4 0.43 0.37 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.32 
High 0.41 0.35 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.30 
All 0.40 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.25  
High-Low 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 [4.00] [-0.70]  [-1.45]  [-5.00]  [-1.23]  [-1.82]  
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Next, I conduct the exactly same analysis but controlling for B/M instead of GP first. Table 11 
exhibits the average returns and DOL estimates for each of the 25 portfolios. The results are 
slightly, but importantly different to those presented in Table 10. I have already showed that 
high DOL, when using a SGA-based point-to-point measurement, is very much linked to high 
gross profitability. When examining Panel C of Table 11, one sees that DOLSGA tends to 
decrease monotonically in B/M, the t-statistic for the difference between the extreme B/M 
quintiles being -10.04, the result effectively having the p-value of 0.00. This result indicates 
that the relationship between DOLSGA and the value premium is actually negative in a cross-
section, hence the result being consistent with the findings of Kisser (2014). Economically this 
means that gross profitability has a risk decreasing effect, virtually this reduction in the risk 
appearing to be greater than the risk increasing effect of increased DOL, hence the total risk 
seems to go down, thus causing the negative interrelationship between DOL and B/M. 
Remarkably, this result is not visible for other measures of DOL, whose result patterns do not 
much change from the previous analysis, thus providing more support for the positive linkage 
between an elasticity measure of DOL and the value premium, and for the negative linkage 
between an elasticity measure of DOL and the gross profitability premium.  
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Table 11: Quintile portfolio sorts on value and gross profitability  
Table presents average monthly returns and operating leverage estimates for 25 portfolios created by sorting stocks first on 
book-to-market (at the end of December of year t-1) and then on gross profitability, which is defined as sales minus cost of 
goods sold scaled by total book assets (at the end of December of year t-1). Portfolios are constructed by using NYSE 
breakpoints and rebalanced at the end of each June. Degree of operating leverage (DOL) estimates include EBITDA-based 
DOL, SGA-based DOL, and book DOL. Tables 2 and D1 describe the construction of DOL estimates in more detail. The data 
sample extends from 1967 to 2014, and excludes financials and utilities. 
 
B/M Gross profitability quintile quintile 
  Low 2 3 4 High All 
       
Panel A: Average monthly returns (%)     
Low 0.88 0.93 1.06 1.14 1.42 1.08 
2 1.11 1.13 1.21 1.30 1.51 1.27 
3 1.26 1.20 1.40 1.33 1.74 1.42 
4 1.50 1.35 1.40 1.61 1.84 1.57 
High 1.79 1.71 1.94 2.00 2.08 1.96 
All 1.08 1.27 1.42 1.57 1.96  
High-Low 0.91 0.78 0.87 0.86 0.66 0.88 
 [3.96] [3.37] [3.98] [4.45] [3.78] [4.71] 
       
Panel B: Average DOLEBITDA     
Low 2.25 2.06 1.83 1.84 2.15 2.04 
2 2.25 1.85 1.97 2.07 2.28 2.10 
3 2.58 2.26 2.12 2.16 2.54 2.36 
4 2.97 2.25 2.26 2.41 3.04 2.65 
High 3.35 2.88 2.78 3.03 3.82 3.26 
All 2.04 2.10 2.36 2.65 3.26  
High-Low 1.10 0.82 0.95 1.19 1.67 1.22 
 [6.91] [7.63] [8.72] [11.25] [12.07] [15.84] 
       
Panel C: Average DOLSGA     
Low 0.14 0.21 0.29 0.39 0.64 0.35 
2 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.31 0.56 0.30 
3 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.52 0.28 
4 0.08 0.13 0.19 0.27 0.51 0.27 
High 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.27 0.53 0.28 
All 0.35 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.28  
High-Low -0.06 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 
 [-9.54]  [-12.49] [-14.63] [-12.31]  [-7.47] [-10.04] 
       
Panel D: Average DOLBook     
Low 0.34 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.29 
2 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.30 
3 0.41 0.38 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.32 
4 0.42 0.39 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.32 
High 0.40 0.42 0.35 0.29 0.25 0.33 
All 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.33  
High-Low 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.04 
 [4.47] [10.15] [8.65] [4.19] [-0.48]  [6.76] 
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5.4.1. Discussion 
The prior literature dominantly provides empirical evidence on the positive association 
between DOL and the value premium (see e.g., Carlson et al., 2004; Zhang, 2005; García-
Feijóo and Jorgensen, 2010; Novy-Marx, 2011). For instance, García-Feijóo and Jorgensen 
(2010) uses an elasticity measure of DOL in order to examine the relationship, however, this 
study has shown how such an approach inevitably links their measure of DOL to the value 
premium. Carlson et al. (2004), on the other hand, define the operating leverage to be in a direct 
relationship with the B/M, as they define fixed costs to be directly related to the amount of 
book assets. Their results are empirically aligned with those found by García-Feijóo and 
Jorgensen (2010) as both approaches are virtually dependent on the size of margins, de facto 
the proximity of the break-even point. Zhang (2005) finds also analogous evidence that low 
margins are linked to higher expected earnings. Novy-Marx (2011) finds similar results by 
using a point-to-point proxy for DOL employing practically total costs-to-total assets as a 
proxy. However, his results are not very significant in a cross-section contrary to the 
aforementioned papers. But the reason, why his results indicate to the similar conclusion as the 
papers by Carlson et al. (2004), Zhang (2005), and García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010), might 
be the biased proxy for DOL including the variable costs as well. As the example of Table 1 
shows, the higher total costs may indicate a higher break-even point, thus being exposed to the 
risk related to low margins, and concluding a positive relationship between DOL and the value 
premium.  
 
The results I provide in this section are consistent with the previous literature regarding the 
positive association between certain measures of DOL and the value premium. But when trying 
to capture directly the actual fixed costs with SGA-based DOL, the results are completely 
different. Those contradicting results are, even so, very intuitive and consistent with my 
hypotheses. The results regarding DOLSGA indicate that a higher DOL actually causes 
additional risk, consequently increasing B/M ratio. But at the same time due to the positive and 
strong linkage between DOL and profitability, the profitability causes the risk to decrease as 
firms have higher margins to cope better with economic shocks. Practically, it seems that DOL 
increases the risk while profitability decreases the risk, the impact from the increase in 
profitability on risk being greater, which results in lower total risk. However, these firms with 
high fixed costs and high operating leverages, still have their earnings to be sensitive to changes 
in sales due to the size of operating leverage, they also have a large part of their cost in a form 
that cannot be quickly adjusted downwards if a negative market shock arises. And, this extra 
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risk emanating from DOL that cannot be captured by the value factor due to higher valuations, 
appears to be the risk factor behind the gross profitability premium. This result is consistent 
with the observation of Novy-Marx (2013), who says that highly gross profitably firms earn 
significantly higher returns than firms with low profitability even though having higher 
valuations.  
 
The results of this section also fills in the picture regarding the triangle of relationships between 
DOL and the value premium, between the gross profitability premium and the value premium, 
and between DOL and the gross profitability premium exactly as my hypotheses state. 
Apparently, the missing piece is the definition of the degree of operating leverage, which 
should be fundamentally concerned about the relative size of fixed costs, and not only be 
concerned about the current level of operating margins. Importantly, the proximity of break-
even point is highly dependent on the actual size of unit variable cost as well, as a firm with a 
high unit variable cost virtually requires a relatively high quantity of sales in order to cover the 
fixed costs.  
 
5.5. The gross profitability premium within and across industries 
By following the methodology of Novy-Marx (2011), who examines the link between 
operating leverage and the value premium within and across industries, I present in this section 
the results regarding whether the gross profitability premium is stronger within industries than 
across industries. Such a line of research is relevant as the cost structures between industries 
vary, effectively different industries having different levels of average operating leverage. This 
variation in cost structures may result in the profitability premium to be stronger within 
industries than across industries if investors are indifferent to differences in characteristic cost 
structures across industries, but more concerned about the differences within industries. 
 
Table 12 reports results regarding Fama-MacBeth regressions, showing that intra-industry 
gross profitability ranking within the firm’s industry (parameterized from zero to one) has 
significant power to predict returns even after controlling for value, size, and momentum. One 
can interpret the coefficients regarding the intra-industry GP ranking as the difference in 
required monthly returns between the firms with the highest and the lowest gross profitability 
ranking within the given industry. Contrarily, the inter-industry GP ranking, defined as the 
industry ranking of the firm’s industry (parameterized from zero to one) does not seem to 
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provide any explanatory power on returns, meaning that there does not seem to be any 
difference in required returns between the industry with the highest gross profitability and the 
industry with the lowest gross profitability. These results confirm that the gross profitability 
premium is strong within industries and seemingly weak across industries.  
 
Table 12: Fama-MacBeth regressions with measures of gross profitability within and 
across industries 
Table reports the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of firms’ returns on gross profitability rankings within and across 
industries. The within industry ranking is the firm’s gross profitability ranking (percentile) within industry, and the industry 
ranking is the industry’s gross profitability ranking (percentile). Logarithms of book-to-market (B/M) and size (ME), and the 
past returns for one month and one year are used as controls. The data sample extends from 1967 to 2014, and excludes 
financials and utilities. 
 
 Slope coefficients (x102) and [t-statistics] from the regression rtj = β’ xtj + etj for 
intra- and inter-industry measures   
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
variable 
      
lnGP 0.82     
 [4.14]     
Intra-industry GP ranking  0.50  0.25 0.51 
  [6.50]  [3.31] [6.27] 
Inter-industry GP ranking   0.13 0.05 0.17 
   [0.87] [0.30] [1.17] 
lnB/M 0.40 0.41 0.36  0.42 
 [6.05] [6.05] [5.64]  [6.36] 
lnME -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.19 -0.12 
 [-3.69]  [-3.68]  [-3.91]  [-5.52]  [-3.63]  
r1,0 -4.66 -4.62 -4.69 -4.56 -4.73 
 [-14.78]  [-14.62]  [-14.98]  [-14.45]  [-15.12]  
r12,2 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.12 
 [1.17] [1.27] [1.15] [1.69] [1.05] 
            
 
Equivalently, to the methodology of Novy-Marx (2011), I further test the priced component 
related to gross profitability, which seems to be linked to variation in firms’ operating leverages 
within any given industry, while the unpriced component appears to be linked to variations in 
operating leverages between industries. In order to test those components, I create two distinct 
portfolio sorts, one based on intra-industry gross profitability and another based on industry 
gross profitability. The more detailed description regarding the construction of such variables 
is presented in Methodology section. 
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Table 13: Excess returns to portfolios sorted on gross profitability within and across 
industries 
Table presents the monthly value-weighted average excess returns to portfolios sorted on A) gross profitability within 
industries and B) industry gross profitability. The table shows also the monthly value-weighted average abnormal returns and 
returns to the market factor (MKT), the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), and the momentum factor (UMD) from 
portfolio-wise time-series regressions by following Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The t-statistics are presented 
in square brackets. The data sample extends from 1967 to 2014, and excludes financials and utilities. 
 
    Alphas and four-factor loadings 
Portfolio re α MKT SMB HML UMD 
       
Panel A: Intra-industry portfolios     
       
Intra-industry GP quintiles     
Low 0,30 -0,04 0,96 0,10 0,24 -0,12 
 [6,07] [-1,18]  [25,65] [9,67] [8,07] [-11,31]  
2 0,41 0,13 1,06 -0,03 0,04 -0,04 
 [9,80] [8,14] [177,08] [-4,84]  [4,39] [-5,14]  
3 0,49 0,33 0,98 -0,14 -0,13 -0,07 
 [10,28] [11,76] [107,27] [-23,92]  [-23,04]  [-4,13]  
4 0,61 0,35 0,96 -0,17 -0,15 -0,06 
 [15,81] [15,77] [118,83] [-35,72]  [-18,36]  [-7,52]  
High 0,48 0,41 0,88 -0,20 -0,24 0,00 
 [7,36] [11,97] [73,70] [-9,79]  [-19,56]  [-0,13]  
High-Low 0,17 0,45 -0,08 -0,30 -0,47 0,12 
 [2,87] [7,93] [-2,00]  [-13,19]  [-17,82]  [7,75] 
       
Panel B: Industry portfolios     
       
Industry GP quintiles      
Low 0.55 0.07 1.01 -0.09 0.28 0.08 
 [2.53] [0.55] [24.17] [-1.45]  [3.53] [1.12] 
2 0.74 0.17 1.12 -0.01 0.07 -0.05 
 [3.26] [1.19] [28.43] [-0.15]  [0.80] [-0.82]  
3 0.60 0.29 1.03 0.09 -0.37 -0.12 
 [2.79] [1.93] [24.82] [1.81] [-4.39]  [-2.07]  
4 0.60 0.22 0.88 -0.02 -0.31 -0.09 
 [2.81] [1.65] [15.01] [-0.31]  [-3.56]  [-1.49]  
High 0.67 0.39 0.84 -0.12 -0.46 -0.07 
 [3.28] [2.47] [17.01] [-1.82]  [-6.70]  [-0.97]  
High-Low 0.13 0.32 -0.17 -0.03 -0.74 -0.15 
 [0.69] [1.60] [-2.41]  [-0.27]  [-6.94]  [-1.34]  
              
 
Table 13 gives the value-weighted time-series average excess returns, abnormal returns, and 
loadings of the Carhart four-factor model factors. Panel A displays the regression results for 
intra-industry sort on gross profitability and Panel B for industry sort on gross profitability. 
The excess returns for intra-industry sort increase almost monotonically, while the statistical 
significance between the extreme quintiles is statistically highly significant at 1 percent 
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confidence level. Notably, the abnormal returns increase monotonically, signaling that the 
component unpriced by the four-factor model grows while moving towards more gross 
profitable firms within industries. The opposite results apply to Panel B and the industry-sort, 
in which the difference in excess returns between the industries with the highest gross 
profitability and the industries with the lowest gross profitability does not statistically differ 
from zero. Moreover, the difference in abnormal returns for the industry sort is not statistically 
significant between the high and the low gross profitability industries. However, interestingly 
the industries belonging to the highest industry gross profitability quintile generate statistically 
significant monthly alpha of 0.39 percent, while for other quintiles the four-factor model seems 
to price the risk associated to portfolios well enough not to generate any significant alphas.  
 
5.5.1. Discussion 
The value premium, which according to Novy-Marx (2011) appears to be primarily driven by 
variation in B/M ratios within industries, but not by the variation in B/M ratios across 
industries. This finding signals that investors are indifferent to differences in B/M ratios when 
those differences arise from industry characteristics. This section finds similar results regarding 
the gross profitability premium. As operating leverage appears to be a considerable risk factor 
behind the gross profitability premium, and there are considerable differences in cost structures 
across industries, and hence in degrees of operating leverage, it would make sense if the gross 
profitability premium was more driven by priced differences within industry and not so much 
driven by the differences across industries. And, this is the direction my results are pointing at. 
Higher gross profitability premium within given industry predicts higher excess returns, while 
there is no statistically meaningful difference in excess returns between different industries.  
 
6. Robustness tests 
To check the robustness of the results of this paper, I conduct the analyses of this paper by 
using subperiods of time to examine whether the results are robust in time and whether there 
are any noteworthy differences. In practice, I divide the main dataset covering the years from 
1967 to 2014 into two halves of same length (1967-1990 and 1991-2014) and run the tests 
employed in this paper for the both datasets by using DOLEBITDA and DOLSGA as proxies for 
DOL. Selected results regarding the robustness checks are presented in Appendix B, while rest 
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of the results are unreported as they are aligned with the main findings, and hence do not 
provide any further insight.   
 
Most importantly the results of the analyses regarding the two subperiods are in line with the 
main results indicating the existence of the gross profitability premium, and that DOL (when 
approximated by using DOLSGA) is the risk factor behind the particular premium within the 
two subperiods. However, it actually seems that the gross profitability premium has 
strengthened in time. For example, the high-minus-low strategy on gross profitability has 
generated considerably higher abnormal returns in the latter period of time both in economic 
and statistical terms (see Table B3). Simultaneously, risk associated with DOLSGA has 
strengthened while the risk captured by DOLEBITDA has remained at somewhat same level 
within the two subperiods of time (see Table B4 and Table B5).  
 
Furthermore, the results show that elasticity measures of DOL (when approximated by using 
DOLEBITDA) have been merely linked to the value premium over time, while DOLSGA has 
negatively been linked to book-to-market. Also, the results regarding the gross profitability 
premium within and across industries are aligned with the main results within the two 
subperiods.  
 
There are two interesting differences between different periods of time. Firstly, the statistical 
significance of the risk premium required by investors for being exposed to DOLEBITDA seems 
to become statistically highly significant in the latter period, while completely lacking (without 
any controls) of statistical significance in the earlier period of time (see Table B1). However, 
in economic terms this result is somewhat insignificant. Secondly, DOLEBITDA seems to be 
more related to gross profitability in the latter time period. Nonetheless, the economical and 
statistical significance of this result is still far from that of DOLSGA. Consequently, I conclude 
that the main findings of this paper are robust in time. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The gross profitability premium is an anomaly in stock markets found by Novy-Marx (2013), 
in which highly profitable firms tend to earn higher excess returns than firms with low 
profitability. The prior literature finds it hard to reconcile this anomaly from a rational risk-
62 
 
based view, as profitable firms should be better positioned to cope with negative market shocks 
than those with a low profitability. Kisser (2014) proposes that operating leverage, which is 
traditionally defined as the proportion of fixed costs to variable costs, causes the gross 
profitability premium. However, he could not explain why his approach of measuring DOL 
can explain the profitability premium and has simultaneously negative correlation with the 
value premium, whereas the plethora of prior research suggests the exact opposite, hence not 
providing a robust proof whether DOL causes the gross profitability premium.   
 
My paper answers to these questions, and provides explanation why different methods of 
approximating DOL either can or cannot explain the gross profitability premium, and why the 
sign of the correlation between DOL and the value premium appears to be sensitive to approach 
to create a proxy for DOL, and whether DOL really causes the gross profitability premium. For 
that reason, it is crucial to understand how operating leverage affects firms’ risk characteristics, 
and hence how the proxy for operating leverage should behave. 
 
Fundamentally operating leverage should describe the operational leverage of a firm, which 
boosts the operating profits once sales are above the break-even point, but limits the firm’s 
operational flexibility when sales are low as fixed costs do have much lower beta than revenues 
have, effectively being zero when a short enough period of time is considered. Thus, operating 
leverage should affect the operational risk of a firm via the following channels: Cost trade-off 
from variable costs to fixed costs increasing the absolute sensitivity of earnings to sales, higher 
break-even point, and higher fixed costs in absolute terms. Even though higher operating 
leverage increases risk, it enables high profitability as well. A firm may have a high gross 
profitability if it prefers to have low variable costs but relatively higher fixed costs, hence it 
seems that gross profitability is merely linked to cost trade-off. But operating leverage may 
increase the risk also by increasing the amount of fixed costs in a way that variable unit cost 
remains the same. Here the gross profitability does not change, even though incremental fixed 
costs (such as additional sales force) are introduced, but if the sales rise well above the break-
even point, boosting the operating margins, then the firm enjoys high operating profitability. 
This intuition gives an interesting prediction that gross profitability premium and the operating 
profitability premium (empirically recognized by Ball et al., 2015) are caused by the different 
channels of operating leverage affecting the operational risk. But this prediction is left for 
further research.  
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To complement the previous reasoning the gross profitability premium should accrue for high 
DOL firms that are highly gross profitable, i.e., they have relatively low variable costs, but they 
are operationally profitable enough to have such high valuations leading to lower book-to-
market ratios. And as the B/M ratios are at a relatively low level, the risk emanating from high 
DOL cannot be captured by the value premium, but the gross profitability premium. 
 
My paper provides strong empirical support for the aforementioned intuition of the gross 
profitability premium being caused in general by the degree of operating leverage. First, I 
confirm that the measure of DOL proposed by Kisser (2014) captures much of the same risk 
as gross profitability. Second, I show that gross profitable companies have considerably higher 
levels of operating leverage than their less gross profitable peers. Third, I confirm the direct 
link between DOL and the gross profitability, hence concluding that the empirical evidence 
supports the hypothesis that operating leverage is the primary risk factor behind the observed 
gross profitability premium. Furthermore, I show that this particular link is highly sensitive to 
how DOL is understood and how the proxy is constructed as fixed costs are not directly 
observable. These findings will explain why the literature has a controversial view regarding 
the triangle of relationship between DOL, the gross profitability premium, and the value 
premium.  
 
The intuition behind DOL affecting the risk and simultaneously enabling high profitability is 
obvious, but difficulties arise when one needs to measure the degree of operating leverage, as 
the clean amount of fixed costs is not available. Consequently, a method to approximate DOL 
is required. Furthermore, as this paper shows, the choice of an approach to measure DOL has 
a high significance on the results, which seems to be the missing piece why the prior literature 
has not been able to link the gross profitability premium to risk-based explanations 
convincingly.  
 
The traditional elasticity-based definition of DOL, a flow measure of sales and earnings, 
appears not to be purely linked to the relation of fixed and variable operating costs, but to the 
margins, i.e., the closer a firm operates to its break-even point the higher is its elasticity 
measure of DOL. Notably, margins do depend on both the variable and the fixed costs, thus 
enabling a high elasticity measure of DOL for a firm with low fixed costs and extremely high 
variable costs, effectively causing a low profit margin. This particular firm then operates close 
to its break-even point, which means that earnings may be highly sensitive to changes in sales 
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when just operating above the zero earnings. Well, this description contradicts with the 
fundamental idea of DOL, in which fixed costs are relatively large, for instance, compared to 
variable costs. Hence, it appears intuitively and empirically confirmed in this paper, that an 
elasticity measure of DOL is strongly related to operating margins, regardless whether the 
proximity of margins is due to high unit variable cost or high fixed costs. My empirical findings 
confirm that with an elasticity measure of DOL it is not possible to explain the gross 
profitability premium as it does not seem to capture the absolute sensitivity of earnings arising 
from higher proportion of fixed costs relative to variable costs (cost trade-off) nor the risk of 
having a greater proportion of total costs as fixed, and hence having a large part of costs not 
well adaptable for negative changes in the market. Therefore, a DOL measure, which is 
independent of the level of sales, the level of unit variable cost, the level of margins, and the 
proximity of the break-even point should be able to capture the risk emanating from relatively 
high fixed costs, thus from relatively high degree of operating leverage.  
 
When approximating the relative size of fixed costs and DOL by using a direct approach that 
is not biased by the aforementioned defects, my predictions regarding the risk fundamentally 
associated with operating leverage and regarding the association between operating leverage 
and the gross profitability premium can be confirmed. As such an approximation approach I 
use the measure of DOL proposed by Kisser (2014), which is sales, general, and administration 
expenses (SGA) relative to total book assets (AT). Empirically, SGA/AT seems to describe the 
risk associated with the relatively high fixed costs better than any other currently available 
approach, thus representing the true degree of operating leverage somewhat well. This 
discussion suggests that the definition of DOL, and its implications on constructing a proxy for 
it, need to be considerably reconsidered and unified in the literature.   
 
Furthermore, my research makes a contribution to explain the triangle of relationships between 
DOL, the gross profitability premium, and the value premium. The previous literature 
possesses an inconsistent view regarding the correlations between those three. Novy-Marx 
(2013) finds evidence of the negative correlation between gross profitability (GP) and the value 
premium, and number of research report the positive association between DOL and the value 
premium. Kisser (2014), on the other hand, finds a negative relation between GP and the value 
premium, while providing support on the positive link between his measure of DOL and the 
gross profitability premium. I provide evidence that examination of these relationships is 
sensitive to the choice of a method to approximate DOL. An elasticity measure of DOL 
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explains why the previous literature has linked the value premium and DOL, as their DOL 
captures the risk of low margins as the B/M ratio does. Whereas the DOL based on fixed costs 
explain the negative relationship between DOL and the value premium, as it enables high 
profitability, which in effect, decreases B/M ratios, causing a negative relationship between 
those two.  
 
Finally, I provide evidence that similarly to the characteristics of the value premium, the gross 
profitability premium is also stronger within industries than across industries, as cost structures 
vary between industries and investors seem to be indifferent to these differences.  
 
By unraveling the true cause of the gross profitability premium, both in academic and economic 
terms this paper provides an interesting basis for researching and constructing new investment 
strategies that employ DOL as a risk factor instead of gross profitability. Especially, as the 
association between DOL and the value premium is negative, the setting is established for 
examining strategies that capture the value premium, but also capture the risk of high DOL 
simultaneously without increasing the overall risk.  
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Appendix A – Data sample characteristics 
Table A1: Annual sample characteristics for low (high) gross profitability firms 
Table displays average annual values of gross profitability (GP), book-to-market (B/M), market equity (ME), degrees of 
operating leverage based on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT), and sales, general, and administrative expenses (SGA) for low (high) gross profitability portfolios. Portfolios 
are constructed by using NYSE breakpoints and rebalanced at the end of each June. See Table D1 for DOL definitions. 
Summary statistics are for the time period starting in January 1967 and ending in December 2014. Financials and utilities are 
excluded from the sample. The sample consists of 4,407 firms and 724,324 monthly observations.  
 
 GP B/M ME ($106) DOLEBITDA DOLEBIT DOLSGA Number 
Year Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High of firms 
1967 0.23 0.87 0.90 0.87 179 139 2.50 2.20 2.71 2.70 0.15 0.66 107 
1968 0.17 0.81 0.71 0.46 354 433 2.07 1.62 2.84 1.92 0.09 0.58 836 
1969 0.17 0.81 0.56 0.37 354 568 1.62 1.55 2.46 1.84 0.08 0.57 891 
1970 0.17 0.79 0.91 0.51 239 464 1.98 1.71 2.90 2.12 0.09 0.56 928 
1971 0.15 0.78 1.15 0.60 298 643 2.46 1.86 3.17 2.27 0.09 0.57 972 
1972 0.15 0.75 1.11 0.59 287 729 2.21 2.01 3.34 2.56 0.10 0.56 1,030 
1973 0.17 0.75 1.16 0.65 270 685 2.34 1.95 3.58 2.46 0.09 0.54 1,099 
1974 0.19 0.74 1.77 1.35 235 521 2.08 1.93 3.03 2.45 0.09 0.53 1,220 
1975 0.19 0.75 2.81 1.96 209 422 2.29 2.16 3.31 2.75 0.11 0.55 1,265 
1976 0.18 0.79 2.14 1.34 274 444 1.91 1.98 2.80 2.48 0.11 0.58 1,269 
1977 0.20 0.82 1.60 1.12 308 363 2.05 2.26 2.86 2.81 0.10 0.60 1,305 
1978 0.20 0.81 1.50 1.12 319 373 2.22 2.31 3.15 2.79 0.10 0.59 1,301 
1979 0.20 0.80 1.44 1.11 484 376 2.13 2.57 2.93 3.11 0.10 0.58 1,294 
1980 0.21 0.80 1.26 0.99 444 357 2.08 2.18 2.92 2.69 0.10 0.58 1,354 
1981 0.19 0.80 1.17 0.95 509 489 2.20 2.05 3.03 2.49 0.10 0.59 1,310 
1982 0.19 0.82 1.30 0.96 434 477 2.26 2.23 3.31 2.66 0.11 0.60 1,259 
1983 0.16 0.81 1.21 0.77 560 820 2.52 2.07 4.51 2.68 0.11 0.61 1,223 
1984 0.15 0.82 0.99 0.63 536 830 2.63 2.20 5.06 2.97 0.10 0.61 1,189 
1985 0.16 0.82 1.17 0.71 625 947 2.76 2.35 5.39 3.21 0.10 0.62 1,146 
1986 0.15 0.80 1.04 0.57 628 1,204 3.21 2.50 5.81 3.44 0.10 0.60 1,145 
1987 0.11 0.79 1.11 0.59 1,011 1,047 3.17 2.57 5.26 3.61 0.09 0.60 1,095 
1988 0.13 0.80 1.14 0.66 813 1,142 3.16 2.13 4.45 2.98 0.09 0.60 1,118 
1989 0.12 0.81 0.97 0.58 1,107 1,219 3.27 2.52 4.30 3.67 0.10 0.62 1,153 
1990 0.14 0.81 0.88 0.55 1,561 1,571 2.90 2.07 4.35 2.96 0.10 0.61 1,139 
1991 0.13 0.80 1.23 0.80 1,280 1,626 2.51 2.47 3.66 3.47 0.09 0.61 1,259 
1992 0.11 0.80 1.00 0.56 1,489 1,896 2.92 2.57 4.52 3.73 0.09 0.61 1,343 
1993 0.11 0.80 0.98 0.50 1,699 1,537 3.23 2.65 5.34 3.67 0.08 0.60 1,391 
1994 0.11 0.79 0.75 0.49 2,040 1,447 3.41 3.09 5.83 4.39 0.09 0.60 1,407 
1995 0.10 0.76 0.84 0.51 2,409 2,219 3.05 2.90 5.68 4.18 0.08 0.56 1,432 
1996 0.11 0.76 0.75 0.52 2,659 2,693 2.97 2.89 5.45 4.07 0.08 0.56 1,437 
1997 0.11 0.75 0.72 0.49 3,312 4,148 2.65 2.46 4.74 3.68 0.07 0.55 1,495 
1998 0.11 0.76 0.67 0.42 4,781 6,202 2.64 2.73 3.69 3.55 0.08 0.56 1,507 
1999 0.08 0.74 0.93 0.47 5,574 7,322 3.14 2.65 4.88 3.52 0.08 0.54 1,491 
2000 0.09 0.75 0.96 0.53 4,537 7,109 2.73 3.36 4.98 4.31 0.07 0.55 1,476 
2001 0.11 0.76 1.26 0.74 4,700 6,035 2.87 3.16 4.22 4.62 0.10 0.56 1,588 
2002 0.10 0.73 1.06 0.64 4,136 4,684 3.21 3.21 4.86 4.54 0.10 0.57 1,626 
2003 0.08 0.71 1.13 0.75 4,335 4,732 3.44 3.39 5.21 4.70 0.09 0.55 1,621 
2004 0.09 0.67 0.74 0.45 4,193 5,121 3.17 3.36 5.73 5.00 0.09 0.52 1,666 
2005 0.11 0.69 0.65 0.42 5,203 4,346 3.14 3.60 5.47 4.92 0.09 0.52 1,651 
2006 0.10 0.70 0.69 0.43 5,389 6,035 2.86 3.56 4.79 5.19 0.09 0.52 1,598 
2007 0.12 0.69 0.68 0.41 7,434 6,755 2.92 3.65 5.01 5.16 0.10 0.51 1,521 
2008 0.10 0.70 0.77 0.50 7,143 5,876 3.32 3.55 4.98 4.97 0.10 0.51 1,473 
2009 0.07 0.72 1.61 0.97 4,224 5,071 4.76 3.90 6.79 5.68 0.11 0.54 1,511 
2010 0.07 0.69 0.90 0.57 6,365 4,924 3.55 3.79 5.74 5.60 0.09 0.53 1,497 
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2011 0.09 0.69 0.80 0.50 7,696 5,621 3.65 4.21 5.52 6.90 0.08 0.50 1,486 
2012 0.08 0.68 1.12 0.57 6,167 6,388 2.95 4.15 5.07 6.38 0.09 0.50 1,491 
2013 0.05 0.68 1.08 0.55 7,826 6,731 3.02 3.80 5.24 6.28 0.09 0.51 1,478 
2014 0.05 0.62 1.02 0.44 7,552 7,731 4.15 3.84 7.44 5.68 0.10 0.46 1,263 
Average 0.13 0.76 1.09 0.69 2,587 2,761 2.80 2.71 4.42 3.75 0.09 0.57 1,299 
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Table A2: Industry-wise sample characteristics 
Table displays time-series averages of industry characteristics including gross profitability (GP), book-to-market (B/M), 
market equity (ME), degrees of operating leverage based on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA), earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), and sales, general, and administrative expenses (SGA). See Table D1 
for DOL definitions. Summary statistics are for the time period starting in January 1967 and ending in December 2014. 
Industries are based on the classification of Fama and French (1997). Financials and utilities are excluded from the sample. 
The total sample consists of 4,407 firms and 724,324 monthly observations. 28 firms have no identifiable industry within the 
classification of Fama and French (1997), and are thus excluded from the table.  
 
Code Industry  GP B/M ME ($106) DOLEBITDA DOLEBIT DOLSGA 
Number of 
firms 
1 Agriculture 0.26 0.83 2,441 2.75 4.01 0.17 16 
2 Food products 0.51 0.89 2,098 2.61 3.93 0.35 127 
3 Candy and soda 0.55 0.64 11,471 1.31 1.73 0.37 23 
4 Beer and liquor 0.43 0.71 9,455 1.64 2.17 0.28 27 
5 Tobacco products 0.32 0.87 19,398 2.09 3.13 0.24 9 
6 Recreation 0.49 1.05 461 3.28 4.46 0.36 60 
7 Entertainment 0.27 0.95 1,484 2.23 3.53 0.16 79 
8 Printing and publishing 0.49 0.79 972 1.98 2.71 0.34 42 
9 Consumer goods 0.58 0.90 2,925 2.41 3.30 0.42 103 
10 Apparel 0.53 1.12 730 2.76 3.58 0.38 95 
11 Healthcare 0.35 0.77 968 2.15 2.81 0.27 104 
12 Medical equipment 0.47 0.58 1,438 2.43 3.14 0.36 155 
13 Pharmaceutical products 0.43 0.43 11,037 1.97 2.46 0.38 177 
14 Chemicals 0.40 0.74 2,858 1.86 3.04 0.25 112 
15 Rubber and plastic 0.40 0.97 332 1.86 2.51 0.24 70 
16 Textiles 0.34 1.68 303 2.66 4.32 0.20 45 
17 Construction materials 0.36 1.06 706 2.21 3.55 0.22 151 
18 Construction 0.20 1.12 887 2.77 3.49 0.13 63 
19 Steel works 0.25 1.13 1,966 2.73 4.78 0.11 102 
20 Fabricated products 0.33 1.15 124 2.14 3.16 0.20 21 
21 Machinery 0.40 0.89 1,298 2.53 3.60 0.26 228 
22 Electrical equipment 0.41 0.81 1,477 2.22 3.13 0.28 89 
23 Automobiles and trucks 0.36 0.94 3,538 2.30 3.46 0.21 87 
24 Aircraft 0.29 1.01 3,097 2.73 3.83 0.17 41 
25 
Shipbuilding and railroad 
equipment 0.29 0.92 513 1.91 2.25 0.15 12 
26 Defense 0.27 0.74 2,981 2.42 3.04 0.14 8 
27 Precious metals 0.12 0.60 3,816 4.70 7.15 0.05 38 
28 
Non-metallic and industrial 
mining 0.20 0.83 8,247 3.05 4.14 0.08 35 
29 Coal 0.19 0.70 3,074 1.45 5.05 0.05 10 
30 Petroleum and natural 0.23 0.78 9,104 2.16 4.22 0.08 284 
33 Personal services 0.40 0.96 943 2.44 3.34 0.26 54 
34 Business services 0.46 0.71 3,593 2.92 4.16 0.36 528 
35 Computers 0.48 0.66 4,729 3.67 5.24 0.38 192 
36 Electronic equipment 0.38 0.83 2,978 3.31 5.21 0.27 315 
37 Measuring and control 0.47 0.74 1,163 3.11 4.14 0.35 135 
38 Business supplies 0.42 0.90 2,308 2.19 3.52 0.26 84 
39 Shipping containers 0.31 1.09 584 1.98 2.94 0.15 24 
41 Wholesale 0.46 1.04 780 2.19 3.08 0.33 217 
42 Retail 0.71 0.99 2,868 3.31 5.14 0.56 313 
43 Restaurants, hotels, and motels 0.30 0.82 2,107 2.08 3.33 0.14 104 
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Appendix B – Subperiod analysis 
Table B1: Fama-MacBeth regressions employing gross profitability and EBITDA-based 
DOL 
Table reports the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of firms’ returns on gross profitability (GP), which is sales minus 
cost of goods sold scaled by total book assets (AT), and EBITDA-based degree of operating leverage (DOLEBITDA) – see Table 
D1 for the description. Logarithms of book-to-market (B/M) and size (ME), and the past returns for one month and one year 
are used as controls. The data sample covers A) 1967-1990 and B) 1991-2014. Financials and utilities are excluded from the 
sample. 
 
  Slope coefficients (x102) and [t-statistics] from the regression rtj = β’ xtj + etj, 
Independent 
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth regressions using DOLEBITDA (1967-1990)  
DOL 0.00  -0.02  0.00 -0.02 
 [0.08]  [-1.54]  [0.17] [-1.46]  
GP  0.29  0.60 0.30 0.61 
  [1.66]  [3.56] [1.68] [3.55] 
lnB/M   0.41 0.47  0.47 
   [4.19] [4.77]  [4.73] 
lnME   -0.13 -0.12  -0.13 
   [-2.4] [-2.28]  [-2.31]  
r1,0   -6.9 -7.04  -7.04 
   [-14.24] [-14.58]  [-14.57]  
r12,2   0.35 0.29  0.29 
   [1.68] [1.45]  [1.43] 
       
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regressions using DOLEBITDA (1991-2014)  
DOL 0.03  0.01  0.03 0.01 
 [3.02]  [1.34]  [2.99] [1.19] 
GP  0.36  0.48 0.35 0.48 
  [1.95]  [2.61] [1.89]  [2.58] 
lnB/M   0.28 0.34  0.33 
   [3.25] [3.76]  [3.71] 
lnME   -0.14 -0.13  -0.13 
   [-3.36]  [-3.04]   [-3.03]  
r1,0   -2.20 -2.22  -2.22 
   [-6.30]  [-6.37]   [-6.40]  
r12,2   -0.04 -0.03  -0.03 
   [-0.34] [-0.31]  [-0.32] 
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Table B2: Fama-MacBeth regressions employing gross profitability and SGA-based 
DOL 
Table reports the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of firms’ returns on gross profitability (GP), which is sales minus 
cost of goods sold scaled by total book assets (AT), and the degree of operating leverage based on sales, general, and 
administrative expenses (DOLSGA) – see Table D1 for the description. Logarithms of book-to-market (B/M) and size (ME), 
and the past returns for one month and one year are used as controls. The data sample covers A) 1967-1990 and B) 1991-2014. 
Financials and utilities are excluded from the sample. 
 
  Slope coefficients (x102) and [t-statistics] from the regression rtj = β’ xtj + etj, 
Independent 
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth regressions using DOLSGA (1967-1990)  
DOL 0.57  0.60  0.82 -1.59 
 [2.75]  [3.13]  [1.14] [-3.24] 
GP  0.29  0.60 -0.30 2.09 
  [1.66]  [3.56] [-0.46] [4.36] 
lnB/M   0.47 0.47  0.57 
   [4.82] [4.77]  [5.50] 
lnME   -0.11 -0.12  -0.13 
   [-2.01] [-2.28]  [-2.42] 
r1,0   -7.16 -7.04  -7.19 
   [-14.40] [-14.58]  [-14.38] 
r12,2   0.30 0.29  0.27 
   [1.48] [1.45]  [1.37] 
       
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regressions using DOLSGA (1991-2014)  
DOL 0.87  0.73  2.04 0.60 
 [3.03]  [2.88]  [3.02] [1.08] 
GP  0.36  0.48 -1.15 0.13 
  [1.95]  [2.61] [-2.27] [0.29] 
lnB/M   0.33 0.34  0.33 
   [3.93] [3.76]  [3.65] 
lnME   -0.12 -0.13  -0.12 
   [-2.95] [-3.04]  [-3.12] 
r1,0   -2.33 -2.22  -2.35 
   [-6.12] [-6.37]  [-6.22] 
r12,2   -0.09 -0.03  -0.09 
   [-0.73] [-0.31]  [-0.71] 
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Table B3: Excess returns to portfolios sorted on gross profitability 
Table presents the monthly value-weighted average excess returns to portfolios sorted on gross profitability, defined as sales 
minus cost of goods sold (COGS) to total book assets (AT). The table shows also the monthly value-weighted average 
abnormal returns and returns to the market factor (MKT), the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), and the momentum 
factor (UMD) from portfolio-wise time-series regressions by following Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The t-
statistics are presented in square brackets. Portfolios are constructed by using NYSE breakpoints and rebalanced at the end of 
each June. The data sample covers A) 1967-1990 and B) 1991-2014. Financials and utilities are excluded from the sample. 
 
    Alphas and four-factor loadings 
Portfolio re α MKT SMB HML UMD 
       
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on gross profitability (1967-1990) 
Low 0.39 -0.03 1.14 0.05 0.38 0.17 
 [1.16] [-0.19] [22.95] [0.61] [3.87] [1.45] 
2 0.52 0.17 1.07 -0.11 0.30 0.10 
 [1.65] [1.02] [20.11] [-1.59] [3.09] [1.10] 
3 0.54 0.34 1.04 0.05 -0.11 0.07 
 [1.54] [2.93] [23.71] [0.82] [-1.42] [0.85] 
4 0.37 0.17 0.97 -0.05 -0.40 -0.05 
 [1.08] [1.24] [35.14] [-0.72] [-5.48] [-0.73] 
High 0.51 0.42 0.82 -0.10 -0.49 -0.04 
 [1.62] [2.42] [14.28] [-1.22] [-4.10] [-0.47] 
High-Low 0.11 0.45 -0.32 -0.15 -0.87 -0.21 
 [0.42] [1.58] [-3.44] [-1.38] [-6.26] [-1.40] 
       
Panel B: Portfolios sorted on gross profitability (1991-2014) 
Low 0.68 -0.16 0.94 -0.02 0.22 -0.05 
 [2.42] [-0.90] [13.23] [-0.28] [1.95] [-0.48] 
2 0.67 -0.03 1.07 -0.05 0.19 -0.13 
 [2.60] [-0.12] [16.74] [-0.55] [1.36] [-1.10] 
3 0.73 0.15 1.14 -0.05 0.09 -0.11 
 [2.74] [0.90] [22.58] [-0.66] [1.27] [-1.27] 
4 0.89 0.56 1.03 -0.17 -0.24 -0.21 
 [3.50] [2.72] [11.58] [-2.98] [-2.41] [-3.15] 
High 0.78 0.60 0.77 -0.19 -0.54 -0.05 
 [2.57] [2.81] [9.33] [-2.28] [-6.35] [-0.70] 
High-Low 0.11 0.76 -0.18 -0.16 -0.76 0.00 
 [0.40] [2.89] [-1.54] [-1.19] [-5.21] [-0.01] 
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Table B4: Excess returns to portfolios sorted on EBITDA-based DOL 
Table presents the monthly value-weighted average excess returns to portfolios sorted on degree of operating leverage based 
on EBITDA (DOLEBITDA) – see Table D1 for the description. The table shows also the monthly value-weighted average 
abnormal returns and returns to the market factor (MKT), the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), and the momentum 
factor (UMD) from portfolio-wise time-series regressions by following Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The t-
statistics are presented in square brackets. Portfolios are constructed by using NYSE breakpoints and rebalanced at the end of 
each June. The data sample covers A) 1967-1990 and B) 1991-2014. Financials and utilities are excluded from the sample. 
 
    Alphas and four-factor loadings 
Portfolio re α MKT SMB HML UMD 
       
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on DOLEBITDA (1967-1990)   
Low 0.59 0.34 0.92 -0.06 -0.20 0.09 
 [1.81] [2.56] [32.56] [-1.15] [-3.07] [1.79] 
2 0.42 0.26 0.98 -0.15 -0.09 0.03 
 [1.38] [2.38] [36.98] [-2.64] [-0.78] [0.49] 
3 0.41 0.29 0.96 -0.04 -0.14 0.12 
 [1.26] [1.97] [19.62] [-0.52] [-1.63] [1.49] 
4 0.41 0.13 1.03 0.01 0.04 -0.04 
 [1.23] [0.86] [29.03] [0.20] [0.58] [-0.46] 
High 0.57 0.19 1.06 0.10 0.05 -0.17 
 [1.69] [1.21] [21.19] [0.95] [0.42] [-1.40] 
High-Low -0.02 -0.15 0.14 0.16 0.26 -0.25 
 [-0.13] [-0.78] [2.40] [1.21] [1.53] [-1.95] 
       
Panel B: Portfolios sorted on DOLEBITDA (1991-2014)   
Low 0.70 0.32 0.86 -0.17 -0.17 -0.15 
 [2.44] [1.22] [10.96] [-1.96] [-1.47] [-1.64] 
2 0.70 0.25 1.02 -0.27 -0.14 -0.05 
 [2.64] [1.28] [13.39] [-4.58] [-1.57] [-0.98] 
3 0.85 0.36 0.93 -0.07 -0.05 -0.16 
 [3.37] [1.87] [14.61] [-1.33] [-0.40] [-1.59] 
4 0.79 0.09 1.09 -0.03 -0.12 -0.21 
 [3.15] [0.50] [18.99] [-0.65] [-1.74] [-3.11] 
High 0.87 0.30 1.07 0.15 -0.09 -0.04 
 [3.15] [2.06] [17.15] [2.33] [-0.80] [-0.39] 
High-Low 0.18 -0.02 0.20 0.32 0.08 0.11 
 [0.71] [-0.07] [1.96] [3.69] [0.51] [0.76] 
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Table B5: Excess returns to portfolios sorted on SGA-based DOL 
Table presents the monthly value-weighted average excess returns to portfolios sorted on degree of operating leverage based 
on sales, general, and administrative expenses (DOLSGA) – see Table D1 for the description. The table shows also the monthly 
value-weighted average abnormal returns and returns to the market factor (MKT), the size factor (SMB), the value factor 
(HML), and the momentum factor (UMD) from portfolio-wise time-series regressions by following Fama and French (1993) 
and Carhart (1997). The t-statistics are presented in square brackets. Portfolios are constructed by using NYSE breakpoints 
and rebalanced at the end of each June. The data sample covers A) 1967-1990 and B) 1991-2014. Financials and utilities are 
excluded from the sample. 
 
    Alphas and four-factor loadings 
Portfolio re α MKT SMB HML UMD 
       
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on DOLSGA (1967-1990)   
Low 0.45 0.15 1.06 -0.09 0.40 0.20 
 [1.40] [0.69] [20.12] [-0.89] [2.83] [1.51] 
2 0.57 0.20 1.11 -0.08 0.11 -0.04 
 [1.61] [1.70] [35.60] [-1.34] [1.28] [-0.63] 
3 0.49 0.14 1.03 0.07 -0.24 0.05 
 [1.36] [1.40] [24.66] [1.20] [-2.96] [0.97] 
4 0.31 0.28 0.83 -0.04 -0.54 -0.17 
 [0.96] [1.37] [15.05] [-0.35] [-6.63] [-1.96] 
High 0.67 0.40 0.87 -0.09 -0.41 0.06 
 [2.09] [2.80] [21.05] [-1.22] [-3.28] [0.53] 
High-Low 0.22 0.25 -0.18 0.00 -0.81 -0.14 
 [0.69] [0.77] [-2.36] [-0.04] [-4.39] [-0.73] 
       
Panel B: Portfolios sorted on DOLSGA (1991-2014)   
Low 0.40 -0.33 1.20 -0.08 0.33 -0.20 
 [1.14] [-1.34] [16.79] [-0.86] [1.61] [-1.44] 
2 0.79 0.20 1.07 -0.16 0.16 -0.16 
 [3.73] [1.07] [13.83] [-1.75] [1.43] [-1.22] 
3 0.84 0.32 0.97 -0.04 -0.30 -0.08 
 [2.92] [1.36] [19.67] [-0.71] [-3.23] [-1.17] 
4 0.83 0.55 0.97 -0.09 -0.27 -0.20 
 [2.89] [2.92] [9.03] [-1.28] [-2.20] [-3.52] 
High 0.85 0.61 0.78 -0.21 -0.49 0.02 
 [3.01] [2.39] [12.78] [-2.90] [-4.32] [0.18] 
High-Low 0.45 0.94 -0.42 -0.13 -0.82 0.22 
 [1.20] [2.86] [-4.10] [-0.93] [-3.44] [1.03] 
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Table B6: Firm level regressions of operating leverage measures on gross profitability 
Table presents the annual cross-sectional regression results of operating leverage based on A) EBITDA and B) SGA (see Table 
D1 for the descriptions) on gross profitability (GP). Book-to-market (B/M) and size (ME) are used as controls. The t-statistics 
are adjusted for autocorrelation by following Loughran and Schultz (2005). The data sample covers 1) 1967-1990 and 2) 1991-
2014. Financials and utilities are excluded from the sample. 
 
  Average parameter values and [t-statistics] 
Dependent variable Intercept lnGP lnME lnB/M 
     
Panel A: DOLEBITDA as dependent variable    
lnDOLEBITDA (1967-1990) 0.29 -0.23   
 [2.80] [-2.28]   
 0.46 -0.24 -0.04  
 [2.83] [-2.75] [-2.87]   
 0.26 0.04  0.26 
 [1.74] [0.36]  [12.47] 
 0.28 0.04 0.26 0.00 
 [1.00] [0.28] [8.06]  [0.01] 
     
lnDOLEBITDA (1991-2014) 0.32 0.37   
 [10.50]  [2.41]   
 0.84 0.30 -0.08  
 [6.37]  [2.49] [-5.41]   
 0.39 0.61  0.25 
 [14.90]  [4.39]  [5.06] 
 0.72 0.49 0.18 -0.05 
 [5.65]  [5.07] [2.54]  [-2.56] 
     
Panel B: DOLSGA as dependent variable    
lnDOLSGA (1967-1990) -3.03 4.31   
 [-47.33] [43.31]   
 -2.73 4.30 -0.07  
 [-41.82] [44.68] [-16.54]   
 -3.07 4.46  0.14 
 [-30.61] [35.01]  [3.04] 
 -2.80 4.38 0.07 -0.06 
 [-25.88] [35.25] [2.15]  [-16.00] 
     
lnDOLSGA (1991-2014) -3.05 4.40   
 [-78.55]  [57.44]   
 -2.48 4.31 -0.09  
 [-10.12]  [41.37] [-3.85]   
 -3.03 4.55  0.12 
 [-81.06]  [68.72]  [7.35] 
 -2.46 4.28 -0.01 -0.09 
 [-11.81]  [41.29] [-0.56]  [-4.29] 
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Table B7: Fama-MacBeth regressions with measures of gross profitability within and 
across industries 
Table reports the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of firms’ returns on gross profitability rankings within and across 
industries. The within industry ranking is the firm’s gross profitability ranking (percentile) within industry, and the industry 
ranking is the industry’s gross profitability ranking (percentile). Logarithms of book-to-market (B/M) and size (ME), and the 
past returns for one month and one year are used as controls. The data sample covers A) 1967-1990 and B) 1991-2014. 
Financials and utilities are excluded from the sample. 
 
  
Slope coefficients (x102) and [t-statistics] from the regression rtj = β’ xtj + etj for intra- 
and inter-industry measures   
Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) variable 
      
Panel A: 1967-1990      
lnGP 0.93     
 [3.44]     
Intra-industry value  0.56  0.28 0.56 
  [5.43]  [2.63] [5.22] 
Inter-industry value   0.20 0.10 0.26 
   [1.19] [0.60] [1.52] 
lnB/M 0.47 0.48 0.42  0.49 
 [4.77] [4.81] [4.44]  [5.05] 
lnME -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.19 -0.12 
 [-2.29]  [-2.29]  [-2.36]  [-3.34]  [-2.25]  
r1,0 -7.05 -6.98 -7.08 -6.89 -7.14 
 [-14.59]  [-14.39]  [-14.69]  [-14.17]  [-14.87]  
r12,2 0.29 0.33 0.29 0.38 0.27 
 [1.45] [1.59] [1.44] [1.91] [1.32] 
      
Panel B: 1991-2014      
lnGP 0.71     
 [2.43]     
Intra-industry value  0.44  0.22 0.45 
  [3.84]  [2.03] [3.72] 
Inter-industry value   0.05 -0.02 0.45 
   [0.22] [-0.06] [0.35] 
lnB/M 0.33 0.34 0.29  0.35 
 [3.74] [3.71] [3.48]  [3.90] 
lnME -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.19 -0.13 
 [-3.08]  [-3.06]  [-3.38]  [-4.95]  [-3.04]  
r1,0 -2.22 -2.21 -2.25 -2.17 -2.26 
 [-6.37]  [-6.32]  [-6.57]  [-6.26]  [-6.62]  
r12,2 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 
 [-0.29] [-0.34] [-0.33] [-0.06] [-0.33] 
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Appendix C – Subperiod analysis according to García-Feijóo and 
Jorgensen (2010) 
Table C1: Fama-MacBeth regressions employing gross profitability and degree of 
operating leverage 
Table reports the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of firms’ returns on gross profitability (GP), which is sales minus 
cost of goods sold scaled by total book assets (AT), and the different definitions of degree of operating leverage (DOL) based 
on EBITDA and EBIT – see Table D1 for the descriptions. Logarithms of book-to-market (B/M) and size (ME), and the past 
returns for one month and one year are used as controls. By following García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010), the data sample 
extends from 1986 to 2003, and excludes financials and utilities. The difference to García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010) here 
is that they included utilities in their dataset. 
 
  Slope coefficients (x102) and [t-statistics] from the regression rtj = β’ xtj + etj, 
Independent 
variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
Panel A: Fama-MacBeth regressions using DOLEBITDA (1986-2003)  
DOL 0.03  0.01  0.03 0.01 
 [2.56]  [1.26]  [2.57] [1.17] 
GP  0.52  0.68 0.52 0.68 
  [2.52]  [3.24] [2.49] [3.21] 
lnB/M   0.25 0.34  0.34 
   [2.26] [2.95]  [2.88] 
lnME   -0.17 -0.15  -0.15 
   [-2.97] [-2.69]  [-2.69] 
r1,0   -3.17 -3.19  -3.20 
   [-8.08] [-8.14]  [-8.17] 
r12,2   0.10 0.09  0.09 
   [0.86] [0.81]  [0.80] 
       
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regressions using DOLEBIT (1986-2003)  
DOL 0.01  0.01  0.01 0.01 
 [2.02]  [1.16]  [2.11] [1.06] 
GP  0.52  0.68 0.52 0.67 
  [2.52]  [3.24] [2.53] [3.18] 
lnB/M   0.25 0.34  0.33 
   [2.19] [2.95]  [2.80] 
lnME   -0.17 -0.15  -0.15 
   [-2.99] [-2.69]  [-2.71] 
r1,0   -3.17 -3.19  -3.20 
   [-8.05] [-8.14]  [-8.13] 
r12,2   0.09 0.09  0.08 
   [0.82] [0.81]  [0.76] 
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Table C2: Excess returns to portfolios sorted on degree of operating leverage 
Table presents the monthly value-weighted average excess returns to portfolios sorted on degree of operating leverage (DOL) 
based on EBITDA and EBIT – see Table D1 for the descriptions. The table shows also the monthly value-weighted average 
abnormal returns and returns to the market factor (MKT), the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), and the momentum 
factor (UMD) from portfolio-wise time-series regressions by following Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). The t-
statistics are presented in square brackets. Portfolios are constructed by using NYSE breakpoints and rebalanced at the end of 
each June. By following García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010), the data sample extends from 1986 to 2003, and excludes 
financials and utilities. The difference to García-Feijóo and Jorgensen (2010) here is that they included utilities in their dataset. 
 
    Alphas and four-factor loadings 
Portfolio re α MKT SMB HML UMD 
       
Panel A: Portfolios sorted on DOLEBITDA (1986-2003)   
Low 0.83 0.40 0.91 -0.11 -0.15 -0.18 
 [2.01] [1.12] [16.12] [-1.01] [-0.85] [-1.34] 
2 0.64 0.57 0.94 -0.22 -0.11 -0.03 
 [2.15] [2.02] [10.01] [-2.85] [-0.86] [-0.61] 
3 1.05 0.56 0.87 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 
 [3.75] [2.27] [11.71] [-0.78] [-0.57] [-0.59] 
4 0.66 0.17 0.99 -0.01 -0.13 -0.30 
 [2.09] [0.65] [21.43] [-0.12] [-1.23] [-4.70] 
High 0.87 0.22 1.09 0.19 -0.04 -0.27 
 [2.41] [0.73] [26.31] [1.63] [-0.23] [-2.09] 
High-Low 0.04 -0.17 0.18 0.30 0.11 -0.10 
 [0.16] [-0.41] [2.11] [2.33] [0.47] [-0.48] 
       
Panel B: Portfolios sorted on DOLEBIT (1986-2003)   
Low 0.73 0.73 0.84 -0.32 -0.34 -0.18 
 [2.07] [2.35] [10.89] [-4.10] [-2.12] [-1.45] 
2 0.87 0.50 0.99 -0.15 -0.05 0.01 
 [2.61] [1.45] [7.85] [-2.48] [-0.43] [0.15] 
3 0.79 0.20 0.88 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 [2.69] [0.79] [13.06] [0.09] [-0.08] [-0.18] 
4 0.73 0.31 0.97 0.04 -0.07 -0.35 
 [2.23] [1.36] [22.14] [0.49] [-0.64] [-5.53] 
High 0.78 0.07 1.12 0.15 0.14 -0.30 
 [2.22] [0.19] [20.59] [1.19] [0.66] [-1.98] 
High-Low 0.05 -0.66 0.29 0.47 0.47 -0.12 
 [0.20] [-1.29] [2.52] [3.23] [2.04] [-0.67] 
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Appendix D – DOL definitions 
Table D1: DOL definitions 
Table displays definitions for the degree of operating leverage (DOL) proxies used in this paper. EBITDA refers to earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, and EBIT refers to earnings before interest and taxes. SGA refers to 
sales, general, and administrative expenses, AT refers to total book assets, COGS refers to cost of goods sold, TC refers to 
total costs including COGS and SGA, and PPENT refers to property, plant, and equipment, i.e., fixed assets. Table 2 describes 
the construction of elasticity proxies for DOL. 
 
Variable   Description 
   
Operating leverage  
The proportion of fixed operating costs to the proportion of 
variable operating costs 
Degree of operating leverage (DOL)  Magnitude of operating leverage 
   
Elasticity proxies for DOL:   
DOLEBITDA  Sensitivity of EBITDA to sales 
DOLEBIT  Sensitivity of EBIT to sales 
   
Point-to-point proxies for DOL:   
DOLSGA  SGA/AT 
DOLTC  (COGS + SGA)/AT 
DOLBook   5-year average of PPENT/AT 
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